SWITZERLAND’S SECURITY
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Situation Report of the Federal Intelligence Service
SECURITY CANNOT BE TAKEN FOR GRANTED
Unfortunately, the world is not the way we would like it to be. After the end of the Cold War, peace came to be taken for granted. But now a war of aggression is taking place on our continent. We are living through a time of epochal change: Europe has not experienced aggression of this kind since the Second World War.

War is raging in Europe and about Europe. The consequences are global. Switzerland’s security environment has undergone a fundamental change for the worse, the effects of which are likely to be long-lasting. As imperfect as it was even before February 2022, the security architecture in Europe, which was based on trust and cooperation, has been destroyed. Relations between Western states and Russia with its imperialist ambitions and its reactionary conception of government will remain confrontational for years or even decades to come. International relations are currently dominated by tensions between great powers and the formation of blocs rather than a spirit of multilateral cooperation.

Switzerland too will have to adapt to these new realities. It is not yet clear how far-reaching the effects of the current upheaval will be on our understanding of neutrality and on Switzerland’s security policy. While maintaining our neutrality, we nonetheless want to strengthen our cooperation with EU and NATO, because we want to contribute to European Security and because it is in our own security interest to do so.

The FIS maintains a constant focus on the Ukraine War and other trouble spots and conflicts. The overall security situation in Switzerland’s environment has become more unstable, more complex and more unpredictable. Terrorism, violent extremism, cyber attacks, espionage and proliferation are still current, and in some cases acute, threats which necessitate continuous intelligence gathering and alertness.

Viola Amherd, Federal Councillor  
Federal Department of Defence, Civil Protection and Sport DDPS
IN BRIEF
Russia has destroyed the rules-based order for peace in Europe. The effectiveness of international forums for maintaining peace and security, such as the UN or the OSCE, has continued to decline; there are no signs of a stable new world order. The rivalry between the great powers is leaving its mark on the current period of transition. There is a shift toward a bipolar world order shaped by the systemic rivalry between the USA and China. For now, Russia’s war against Ukraine will remain the focal point in Switzerland’s security environment.

- It is unlikely that Russia’s war against Ukraine will be resolved militarily by the end of 2023; indications are pointing to a protracted conflict.

- Ukraine remains dependent on Western support for its very existence. As the war continues, Western pressure on Ukraine to enter into negotiations with Russia on a ceasefire is likely to increase.

- Military setbacks in Ukraine will not deflect the Russian leadership from its objectives. In essence, it is prepared to continue waging its ‘war against the West’ for a long time to come.

- The risk of a military confrontation between Russia and NATO has increased since the war began, even though both the USA and Russia have so far sought to prevent the war from spreading beyond Ukraine’s borders.

- The risk of nuclear escalation has risen since February 2022. It is likely that Russia will repeatedly threaten, perhaps implicitly, but nonetheless unequivocally, to use nuclear weapons; however, it is highly unlikely that it will use a nuclear weapon in Ukraine.

- The war against Ukraine will inflict enormous costs on Russia, but the stability of the regime is not as yet seriously threatened.

- The war is accelerating the trend back to a more bipolar world in future: Europe and the EU remain strategically dependent on the USA. China is in the process of establishing itself as the pole among states opposed to ‘the West’: Russia’s role in Chinese-Russian relations is steadily weakening.

- In the USA, a return of Donald Trump or the election of another isolationist candidate could re-ignite uncertainties about the US engagement in Europe in 2025.

- China and Russia want to transform the status quo of existing institutions, rules and norms. Regional powers such as Türkiye, India and Saudi Arabia are seeking to expand their scope for action. In the Indo-Pacific region, Japan defines China as ‘the greatest strategic challenge in its history’. In Africa, the struggle for influence between the Western states and Russia and China is intensifying.

- Taiwan will continue to be the focal point of geostrategic tensions between China and the USA. It is highly unlikely that China will initiate an armed conflict with Taiwan in 2023.
The threats to Switzerland’s security persist, and have in some respects become more acute.

- An armed attack on Switzerland by Russia remains extremely unlikely.

- The terrorist threat to Switzerland remains at a heightened level and is primarily jihadist-related. The most plausible terrorist scenario is an act of violence carried out by a jihad-inspired lone perpetrator. Psychological problems or personal crises are increasingly significant factors in precipitating the use of violence.

- Terrorist attacks motivated by right-wing extremism, like those in Christchurch (New Zealand) and Halle (Germany) in 2019 or in Hanau (Germany) in 2020, could become more frequent in Europe.

- Violent left-wing extremists will remain largely preoccupied with anti-fascism and the Kurdish question. Direct violence against individuals, especially against persons perceived as belonging to right-wing extremist circles or against security force personnel, is also expected to increase.

- A hard core of violent Covid extremists will persist and, depending on the latest developments, they will incorporate new issues into their arguments. It is therefore likely that violent single-issue extremist groups will emerge, with only loose ties to particular issues characterised by a hodgepodge of ideologies and goals and a high degree of volatility.

The threat to critical infrastructure in Switzerland remains at a heightened level:

- Criminal groups are seeking to obtain money through the use of ransomware and the theft of sensitive data.

- Actions taken by states in the war against Ukraine may have spillover effects leading indirectly to the disruption, partial failure or temporary restriction of critical services in Switzerland.

The threat posed to Switzerland by illegal intelligence activities remains high:

- The threat to Switzerland posed by foreign (mainly Russian and Chinese) espionage remains high. In Europe, Switzerland is one of the states with the highest numbers of Russian intelligence officers operating under diplomatic cover, in part due to its role as a host to international organisations.

- Switzerland’s membership in the UN Security Council increases the espionage threat for Swiss individuals who are responsible for UN Security Council dossiers and topics and who are involved in making decisions and in presenting these decisions publicly and in committees.

As far as proliferation is concerned, the focus is on Russia:

- The FIS aims to prevent the transfer to Russia of goods which it might put to use for sanctioned military activities. Because Russia uses companies in the Eurasian Economic Union and in Tür-
kiy and India for procurement, monitoring activities have to be extended to regions which have received little attention in the past.

**Probability scale as used in this report**

![Probability Scale Diagram](image-url)
The FIS uses a situation radar tool to depict the threats affecting Switzerland. A simplified version of the situation radar, without confidential data, has also been incorporated into this report. This public version lists the threats that fall within the responsibilities of FIS. This public version lists the threats that fall within the responsibilities of FIS and the Federal Office of Police. Topics within the responsibility of other federal agencies are not addressed in this report, but it includes references to their reporting.
STRATEGIC ENVIRONMENT
WAR AGAINST UKRAINE: FROM THE FAILED ATTACK ON KYIV TO THE WAR OF ATTRITION IN EASTERN UKRAINE

The first year of the Russian war against Ukraine has seen a number of twists and turns and yielded new insights. For example, Western intelligence services and military experts initially underestimated both the spirit of resistance of Ukraine’s armed forces and population and the willingness of the West to provide Ukraine with support, particularly weapons support. A number of shortcomings of Russia’s armed forces have also come to light.

At first, Western military aid to Ukraine consisted to a large extent of armaments dating back to the Soviet era. Since summer 2022, however, it has included technologically superior and more complex Western systems. The USA and other Western states are also assisting Ukraine with intelligence and reconnaissance data, and are also, to some extent, involved in operational planning. In autumn 2022, Ukraine was able to conduct successful counter-offensives by detecting and cleverly exploiting gaps and weaknesses in the disposition of Russian forces.

Russia found itself forced by developments on the battlefield to modify its military objectives and to restrict them to capturing the regions of Lukhansk and Donetsk and holding the occupied areas along the Black Sea coast as far as the River Dniepro. The partial mobilisation ordered by Russia

Changes in Russian territorial control during the first year of the war

<table>
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<th>Russian territorial gains</th>
<th>Recaptured by Ukraine</th>
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Figure 4
in September 2022 led to a temporary stabilisation of the front lines. The intensive bombardment of Ukrainian critical infrastructure since October 2022, which has particularly affected the energy sector, has in part been carried out using Iranian-produced attack drones to preserve Russian stocks of long-range precision weapons.

As the war against Ukraine has continued, the Wagner Group has emerged as an increasingly high-profile presence. Since 2014, Wagner has been active in a variety of conflict areas, in Africa and elsewhere. The group does not always operate under the direct command of the Kremlin, but does support Russian power-political interests. It has proven links to Russia’s security apparatus. While the head of the Wagner Group, Yevgeny Prigozhin, has personal contacts to President Putin, he has little if any influence on strategic decisions.
Since 4 April 2023 Finland is officially a member of the alliance.
DECLINING INFLUENCE OF INTERNATIONAL FORUMS

Since February 2022, Switzerland’s security environment has been shaped by the Russian war against Ukraine. The effectiveness of the UN and the Organisation for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE) as international collective security forums for maintaining peace and security has declined further as a result. The UN Security Council is powerless to act when it comes to Ukraine, as Russia, which has violated the UN Charter and has committed war crimes and crimes against humanity in Ukraine, is a permanent member of the Security Council.

EUROPE: MILITARY REINFORCEMENT OF NATO’S EASTERN BORDER

The Russian war against Ukraine has for the time being strengthened the unity of the Western camp. The USA remains central to the defence of Europe and will continue to form the backbone of NATO. In 2022, NATO transitioned from deterrence by tripwire to a robust policy of deterrence by denial: the intention is that combat-ready forces will in future deter and, if necessary, halt or at least significantly slow down any Russian invasion on NATO’s militarily reinforced eastern border. NATO’s Nordic expansion will also strengthen the credibility, legitimacy and appeal of NATO as an alliance of Western states. Militarily, Finland and, after its accession, Sweden will play an important role in defending the Baltic Sea region, including the Baltic states.

USA: RED LINES HAVE SHIFTED

Since February 2022, Ukraine’s symbolic value to the USA has increased. The USA’s red lines have now shifted, and Western military aid has been both expanded and upgraded. Even though the USA, in addition to providing military aid, is trying to substantially and durably weaken the Russian economy and Russia’s armed forces through sanctions and high-tech embargoes, the hope is not that Russia will implode or break up. A struggle between different power groups or a civil war would destabilise the region for years to come. Relations between Russia and the USA will remain confrontational for the foreseeable future. The open antagonism and deep-seated mistrust mean that there is little room for contacts between the USA and Russia other than deconflicting contacts, such as those that occurred in relation to Syria or following the collision of a Russian fighter jet with a US drone over the Black Sea. The same also applies to arms control.
RUSSIA: IMPERIALIST GOALS

Russia is a revisionist power which calls into question the sovereignty of the states which were formerly part of the Soviet Union and places its imperialist and territorial ambitions in Ukraine above its own economic interests. Its intentions extend beyond Ukraine. Russia wants control in Eastern Europe as in Soviet times, either through territorial reintegration or through dominance in the political, economic and security spheres. An additional aim is to curb the USA's and NATO's influence on Russia's western flank.

So far, Western sanctions appear to be having little effect on Russia’s strategic ambitions, and in 2022 Russia’s gross domestic product contracted less than expected. Nonetheless, Western sanctions are making themselves felt in various sectors of Russian industry. The most severely affected to date have been the automotive industry, which is heavily dependent on foreign components, and the IT sector. The Russian hardware industry’s Achilles’ heel is the production of microprocessors. Major Western software suppliers such as Microsoft have also suspended their collaboration with Russian companies. Furthermore, many Russian IT experts have left the country since the war started.

Condemnation of Russian aggression against Ukraine
UN General Assembly vote of 2 March 2022
**CHINA: RUSSIA’S PRINCIPAL TRADING PARTNER**

The scale of Russia’s military aggression against Ukraine has taken China by surprise. It has, however, de facto supported Russia and established itself as its principal trading partner. A growing share of Russia’s oil is going to China at preferential prices. However, China has been measured in its statements about Russia’s war against Ukraine, and likely has urged Russia to refrain from using nuclear weapons. China’s material support for Russia’s war in Ukraine has hitherto been limited.

**CHINA: ECONOMIC RELATIONS WITH WESTERN STATES MORE IMPORTANT THAN THOSE WITH RUSSIA**

In China itself, 2022 saw a slowing of economic growth, which was attributable both to the country’s zero-Covid strategy and to its structural weaknesses. Under pressure from country-wide protests, the Chinese leadership has had to abandon its zero-Covid strategy, but the socio-economic situation remains tense. This is particularly affecting young Chinese people, who are expecting prosperity and social status.

China likely views its economic relations with Western states as more important than its partnership with Russia. In 2022, President Xi Jinping therefore took steps to cultivate China’s relations with European states. He is also striving to develop strategic economic partnerships with states, such as Saudi Arabia, which have a political affinity with China and which possess strategic natural resources or wield significant financial power. China has been able to enhance its role in the Middle East by mediating successfully between Saudi Arabia and Iran.

**CHINA: RELATIONS WITH ITS SYSTEMIC RIVAL, THE USA, AND WITH TAIWAN**

President Xi wants to prevent any uncontrolled deterioration of US-Chinese relations. Communication with the USA is to be maintained at the highest level. The USA, however, has taken offensive economic measures against China, especially in the technology sector. The EU is also seeking to reduce its strategic dependencies on China in the technology sector and is taking steps to counter the adverse consequences of external influence on the EU’s internal market. Further American restrictions on critical cutting-edge technologies will highly likely follow.

China has stepped up its attempts to intimidate Taiwan militarily, and the situation remains tense. During crises or provocations, such as the visit of the speaker of the US House of Representatives in August 2022, both sides act in carefully calibrated ways, as was the case when the USA shot down a Chinese spy balloon in February 2023. A military attack on Taiwan by China is currently highly unlikely, as long as China does not deem any red lines, such as a declaration of independence, to have been crossed.

Taiwan remains the world’s largest exporter of semiconductors and is responsible for
the production of 90 per cent of the latest generation of semiconductors. An armed conflict over Taiwan would result in the semiconductor supply chain collapsing or being severely disrupted, and this would affect every sector of global industry. Even just a blockade of Taiwan would give rise to enormous costs worldwide.

**IRAN: SHOULDER TO SHOULDER WITH RUSSIA IN THE WAR AGAINST UKRAINE**

The Russian war against Ukraine and the Western sanctions against Russia have given the Iranian leadership the opportunity to strengthen its political, economic and military ties with Russia. While Iran’s rhetoric about the war has continued to strike a neutral tone, it has to all intents and purposes placed itself on Russia’s side. The delivery of Iranian drones shows that the Iranian leadership aims to position itself as a reliable partner to Russia, even at the expense of new Western sanctions. It is highly likely that the two states will expand the scope of their security relations still further. This will extend to weapons and technology transfer, information sharing and military cooperation. Iran’s alignment with Russia is part of its re-orientation toward the east.
TÜRKIYE: BUILDING BRIDGES BETWEEN RUSSIA AND UKRAINE

Since the beginning of the war against Ukraine in February 2022, Türkiye has positioned itself as an intermediary, and together with the UN it has played a key role in the conclusion of an agreement on the export of Ukrainian grain and of Russian food products and fertilisers. Türkiye, a NATO member, is maintaining its relations with Russia and with Ukraine without jeopardising its own geostrategic interests in the region. Türkiye is still involved in numerous regional conflicts, such as those in Syria, Libya and the eastern Mediterranean. However, it has made considerable efforts to improve or normalise its relations with states in the Middle East such as Israel, Egypt and the United Arab Emirates. At the same time, Türkiye’s authoritarian government harbours regional ambitions and is causing problems for NATO, for example over its Nordic expansion.

AFRICA: RUSSIA’S GROWING INFLUENCE

As a consequence of the tensions between Russia and the Western states, the great powers are showing a growing interest in Africa. Even before this, however, Russia was already exerting significant political influence in Africa, most notably in Libya, the Central African Republic, Sudan and Mali. The deployment of forces of the Wagner Group, with its links to Russia’s leadership, has contributed to this. In Mali, Wagner forces took advantage of the French military withdrawal in 2022 to establish the group as an indispensable partner to the new regime. Burkina Faso has also moved closer to Russia, in the wake of two military coups and in the face of the threat from jihadists.

Russia is increasingly presenting itself in Africa as a counterpole to the USA and the European states and has had some success in spreading its narrative of an aggressive West. The country is emerging as a politically and militarily significant actor in Africa, but remains of limited relevance economically. Conversely, Africa is becoming more important to Russia as the latter positions itself in relation to the West. Western states are trying to counter Russia’s growing influence in Africa. At the same time, some European states have also been turning to Africa to free themselves from their dependency on Russia for energy. Ironically, one country which has pledged to increase its deliveries of natural gas to Europe significantly is Algeria, a long-standing partner of Russia.

In Africa itself, autocratic tendencies have allowed Russia’s influence to increase. Regimes with little democratic legitimacy use Russian support to shore them up against opposition efforts and Western pressure. Unrelated to Russian activities, Tunisia has also seen a marked increase in authoritarianism – President Kais Saied has disempowered democratic institutions and forced through a revised constitution.
RUSSIA’S WAR AGAINST UKRAINE: WAR OF ATTRITION WITH NO PROSPECT OF AN END ACCEPTABLE TO BOTH SIDES

Russia and Ukraine find themselves in an attritional war of varying intensity. Due to their mutually exclusive goals, this could become a protracted conflict. Both sides are determined to continue fighting; neither Russia nor Ukraine is currently aiming to settle the war by diplomatic means. Even though the attrition of military potential on both sides is considerable, it is unlikely that the conflict can be resolved militarily by the end of 2023. Ukraine is dependent on Western support for its very existence. Ukraine’s maximum goals (withdrawal of Russian forces from Ukraine, including Crimea and eastern Ukraine) differ from America’s main interest (the avoidance of escalation into a NATO-Russia war). As the war continues, Western pressure on Ukraine to enter into ceasefire talks and negotiations to bring about an end to the war is likely to increase.

The war will inflict substantial financial costs not only on Ukraine and on Western states, but also on Russia. Russia’s national budget is coming under severe strain in 2023 and will have to be supplemented from financial reserves built up in preceding years. However, the stability of the regime has not yet come under threat, the state apparatus of repression is intact and all political opposition has in effect been crushed in recent years. The repression has become increasingly systematic, and criticism has been made illegal.

Military setbacks in Ukraine will not deflect the Russian leadership from its objectives. This applies both to its objectives in Ukraine and across the whole sphere of influence it is seeking to establish. The leadership’s innermost circle is prepared to continue waging its ‘war against the West’ for a long time to come.

WAR IN EUROPE AND THE RISK OF NUCLEAR ESCALATION

The war against Ukraine is the largest ground war in Europe since 1945 and involves two great powers, with Russia on the one hand as the aggressor and the USA on the other as the major supplier of military aid to Ukraine. As a result, the risk of military confrontation between Russia and NATO has increased, leading to serious risks of escalation and ultimately potentially disastrous consequences for Switzerland’s security environment. However, an armed attack on Switzerland by Russia remains extremely unlikely.

The risk of nuclear escalation has risen since the start of the war. After both the USA and China warned Russia in autumn 2022 of the consequences of Russian use of a nuclear weapon, President Putin’s nuclear threats have so far had little effect on Western military support to Ukraine and on Ukrainian counteroffensives. While Russia will continue to issue nuclear threats, it is highly unlikely that Russia will actually use a nuclear weapon in Ukraine. The probability of nuclear weapons employment
RISK OF NUCLEAR ESCALATION

Number of statements by Western states and Russia in the period from 27 January 2022 to 2 November 2022 and their purpose

Figure 6
would only rise if Russia were to perceive an existential threat as a consequence of the Ukraine war.

PERIOD OF TRANSITION: VOLATILITY, UNPREDICTABILITY AND INSECURITY

Russia’s unprovoked war of aggression against Ukraine in violation of international law and its subsequent occupation and annexation of territory of an independent state represent a turning point of global significance: Russia’s military aggression has destroyed the rules-based order for maintaining peace and stability in Europe which has been being eroded since at least 2008. The idea of a unified European area of cooperation and security that includes Russia has failed.

What will follow is a transition period characterised by volatility, unpredictability and insecurity and posing traditional and new threats. A stable new world order is not in sight. The present phase is dominated by the rivalry between the great powers USA, China and Russia and by the emergence of two antagonistic blocs: the Western states are defending the current institutions, rules and norms against China, Russia and states like North Korea and Iran, which fundamentally question them and want to overturn them. Regional powers such as Türkiye, India and Saudi Arabia are also seeking to broaden their own scope for action. In addition, a number of non-Western democracies, such as South Africa and Brazil, do not want ‘the West’ to dominate the way global affairs are organised and interpreted.
USA VERSUS CHINA: INCREASING POLARISATION INTO BLOCS

The war in Ukraine is accelerating the trend toward the future re-establishment of a bipolar world order: the current decade will be marked by the systemic competition between the dominant rivals USA and China. Trade relations in the fields of technology and energy are increasingly characterised by the formation of blocs dictated by a security-based logic, which is being accompanied by the emergence of separate spheres of rules and standards.

The USA is the driving force behind the Western response to Russia’s war against Ukraine. Europe remains strategically dependent on the USA. Despite rising expenditure on defence, the EU is a long way from achieving strategic autonomy. On the other hand, it has within the space of a few months succeeded in significantly reducing its dependence on Russian fossil fuels.

At the same time, China is in the process of establishing itself as the pole for states opposed to ‘the West’. Russia’s role in the Chinese-Russian alliance is steadily weakening. At the 20th Party Congress of the Chinese Communist Party, President Xi Jinping did not make a single mention of Russia in his vision of a global order. At the Moscow summit in March 2023, Presidents Putin and Xi celebrated the ‘historical friendship’ between their countries. The meeting will likely not lead to any cooperation between China and Russia that goes significantly beyond the scope of the current political and economic framework. Furthermore, it remains highly uncertain whether China has the ability to bring about a peaceful resolution of the Russian-Ukrainian conflict.

A strategic rethink has taken place in the Indo-Pacific region: in its new security strategy, Japan defines China as ‘the greatest strategic challenge in its history’. It is substantially expanding its military capability to defend itself against China and the growing threat from North Korea. Japan is thus becoming an even more important alliance partner for the USA in the geopolitical struggle with China.
USA: UNCERTAINTY ABOUT FUTURE ENGAGEMENT IN EUROPE

The USA has been planning its strategic alignment toward the Indo-Pacific region since Barack Obama’s presidency. The Biden administration’s National Security Strategy of October 2022 also stresses that China is central to America’s security strategy. In addition, the USA is seeking to focus NATO’s attention more on the challenge from China. It is also uncertain, in the light of domestic political trends in the USA, to what extent it will maintain its engagement in Europe beyond Joe Biden’s presidency. A return of Donald Trump or the election of another isolationist candidate could re-ignite uncertainties about the US engagement in Europe in 2025. The USA will demand, even more than hitherto, that its European allies take on greater responsibility for security in Europe.

CHINA: DOMINANT ROLE OF THE COMMUNIST PARTY AND PRESIDENT XI

The re-elected President and Party Chairman Xi Jinping is eager to strengthen the dominance of the Communist Party in all China’s institutions and in Chinese society as a whole. The party’s ideology places the defence of China’s collective interests above personal freedoms and gives party and state the right to interfere in private economic matters. It effectively places China in a systemic rivalry with the Western states and makes the reunification of Taiwan with the Chinese mainland one of the nation’s key goals. Given these guiding principles, the conflict between the US and Chinese systems will intensify.

China has an ambitious agenda in terms of economic growth and innovation in cutting-edge technologies. Several factors will hamper the realisation of these ambitions, including the indebtedness of public companies and of the regions, property speculation, administrative sluggishness, corruption and American trade barriers relating to technology. In addition, China, whose population decreased in 2022 for the first time in 60 years, faces the problem of marked social inequality and a difficult labour market. This particularly affects young Chinese people and will be President Xi’s greatest political challenge in the years to come. The regime will therefore continue to develop its technological tools for monitoring the population and to pursue its authoritarian sinicisation policy toward Tibetans and Uighurs.
Taiwan will continue to be the focal point of geostrategic tensions between China and the USA. Added to this is China’s perception of increasing hostility from Japan. Faced with strong American support for Taiwan and a doubling of the Japanese defence budget, China will concentrate its efforts on developing its military power, while still continuing its attempts to intimidate Taiwan. However, it remains highly unlikely that China will initiate an armed conflict with Taiwan in 2023, since it still lacks sufficient military resources and operational capabilities. There are also military tensions in the South China Sea, as well as those with India in the Himalayas.
TÜRKIYE: BALANCING ACT BETWEEN THE WESTERN STATES AND RUSSIA AND CHINA

After the presidential and parliamentary elections, the centenary of the Turkish Republic will dominate both its domestic and its foreign policy. The economic situation will remain fragile because of high inflation and the weak lira. The regional power will likely continue to focus its activities mainly on the eastern Mediterranean region and Syria, and Türkiye will continue its attempts to exploit and expand its own scope for action and opportunities. Türkiye will seek to maintain its relations with the Western states, while at the same time trying to strengthen its relations with Russia and China.

IRAN: PROTESTS NOT A DIRECT THREAT TO THE REGIME

A part of the Iranian population will continue to protest against the regime. The protest movement presents a significant but not directly existential challenge to the regime. The legitimacy crisis exacerbated by the protests or the death of the spiritual leader could lead to power shifts in the regime.

A large part of the Iranian diaspora community abroad, including in Switzerland, supports the protests and is calling for regime change. The Iranian regime argues, particularly in view of actions by the Iranian diaspora, that the protests are being fomented from abroad. Against this background, the activities of the Iranian intelligence services against the diaspora community are likely to increase further, including in Switzerland.
AFRICA: STRUGGLE FOR INFLUENCE INTENSIFYING

The struggle between Russia and Western states for influence in Africa will continue and may even intensify. China will also use its economic and financial power to continue establishing itself as an actor in Africa.

In Burkina Faso, in particular, the Wagner Group might be able to grow into a regime-supporting role similar to the one it plays in Mali. However, the Western states, especially France and the USA, will likely try to push back Wagner forces on the African continent. The Western states are likely to make particular efforts to end the deployment of Wagner forces in Libya, which is plagued by civil war. The Russian presence poses a particular threat here, as the country is rich in crude oil and natural gas. It also lies in a strategically important location in proximity to Europe, for example with regard to migration routes or energy supply.

The competition for Western investment should have an increasing impact on the renewable energy sector, with several African states presenting possible locations based on their geographical advantages. This also brings with it the potential for regional conflict. The relationship between North African neighbours Morocco and Algeria remains strained, however, primarily because of the dispute over the political status of the Western Sahara. If Morocco forces the issue of the Western Sahara, there is a risk of armed escalation. Even Tunisia, the last hope of the Arab Spring, is a factor in North Africa remaining an area of unrest: if opposition to the autocratic President Saied reaches a critical mass, the situation risks erupting into violence.

The growing trend toward authoritarianism in Africa, combined with low levels of law enforcement pressure, is likely to lead to a further increase in jihadist activities in West, Central and East Africa.

Probability scale
Russia has destroyed the rule-based order for maintaining peace and stability in Europe.

**EUROPE**
- Russia’s war against Ukraine is the largest ground war in Europe since 1945.
- Russia will continue to issue nuclear threats; however, it is highly unlikely that it will actually use a nuclear weapon.

**UNITED STATES**
- The United States remain central to the defence of Europe; NATO has militarily reinforced its eastern border.
- A Republican administration from 2025 could re-ignite uncertainties about the US engagement in Europe.
WHAT DOES THE FIS EXPECT?

There are indications that the war in Ukraine could become a protracted conflict. The systemic competition between the United States and China is shaping the future world order.

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**SWITZERLAND**
- The threat of terrorism remains at a heightened level, whilst that posed by foreign espionage remains high.
- An increase in direct violence by left-wing extremists against targets including the security forces is considered likely.

**RUSSIA**
- Russia’s imperialist ambitions extend beyond Ukraine: it seeks control over Eastern Europe.
- The war against Ukraine remains a war of attrition, with no prospect of a diplomatic settlement.

**CHINA**
- China regards its economic relations with Western states as more important than its partnership with Russia.
- A military attack on Taiwan is currently highly unlikely, but already a blockade would give rise to enormous costs worldwide.

**NEAR AND MIDDLE EAST, AFRICA**
- Iran has strengthened its political, economic and military ties with Russia. Russia is emerging as a politically and militarily significant actor in Africa.
- Iran’s expansion of its strategic relations with Russia is likely to extend to weapons and technology transfer and military cooperation.
JIHADIST AND ETHNO-NATIONALIST TERRORISM
EVENTS RELATING TO JIHADIST TERRORISM IN EUROPE SINCE 2022
TERRORIST THREAT REMAINS ELEVATED

In Switzerland, the terrorist threat remains elevated. It emanates primarily from the jihadist movement, in particular from sympathisers of ‘Islamic State’ and from individuals who have been inspired by jihadist propaganda. ‘Islamic State’ and al-Qaeda are the major protagonists of the jihadist movement and are thus also central to the terrorist threat.

The number of jihadist-motivated acts of violence in Europe has again decreased significantly. The perpetrators are often inspired by jihadist ideologies, but perpetrators’ psychological problems, together with other factors, also often contribute to the willingness of radicalised individuals to use violence. Since the terrorist attack in Vienna on 2 November, 2020, ‘Islamic State’ has not claimed responsibility for any more acts of violence.

By contrast, the number of police interventions against Islamists in Europe who are prepared to use violence remains high. These have likely prevented a number of attacks. In Switzerland, too, the police conducted two interventions as part of coordinated campaigns to combat terrorism: in June 2022, three suspected terrorists were arrested in Zurich canton, and in September 2022 two more were arrested in the cantons of Waadt and Geneva on suspicion of having supported ‘Islamic State’.

At present, the most plausible terrorist scenario in Switzerland is an act of violence carried out by a jihadist-motivated lone perpetrator. In the FIS’s view, such an attack would most likely be directed against poorly protected targets and would require little in the way of organisational or logistical resources.

‘ISLAMIC STATE’ AND AL-QAEDA

In October 2022, the Federal Council decided to continue the ban on al-Qaeda, the ‘Islamic State’ group and related organisations, and issued a corresponding organizational ban.

Since the fall of the territorial caliphate in 2019, the core organisation of ‘Islamic State’ has suffered significant losses in terms of its capability to plan and carry out attacks in Europe independently. However, with its propaganda disseminated online, ‘Islamic State’ continues to play an important role as a source of inspiration for potential perpetrators of violence.

In 2022, two caliphs of ‘Islamic State’ met violent ends, which might well diminish the organisation’s appeal to possible new supporters. Nevertheless, when the caliphs’ successors were appointed, ‘Islamic State’ was able to successfully conduct internationally coordinated media campaigns, obtaining oaths of allegiance from all regional groupings. Its regional groups in Africa, the Middle East and Asia, some of which are highly active, pursue primarily regional agendas, and Swiss interests might be adversely affected by their actions, particularly in their respective areas of influence.

The latent threat from al-Qaeda persists, despite the killing of its leader, Ayman al-Zawahiri, in summer 2022. Al-Qaeda is
REPATRIATION OF NATIONALS OF EUROPEAN STATES FROM KURDISH CAMPS AND PRISONS IN NORTH-EAST SYRIA
likely benefiting from an easing of counterterrorist pressure following the takeover of power by the Taliban in Afghanistan. Though it lacks the capabilities and resources for attacks in Western countries, the threat from al-Qaeda affiliates remains, particularly in West and East Africa. In their areas of operation, these affiliates are in a position to carry out attacks on Western targets or to abduct nationals of Western states. Here too, Swiss interests might be adversely affected.

JIHADIST-MOTIVATED TRAVELLERS

While they constitute a minority of terrorist actors, jihadist-motivated travellers may, however, have combat experience, can draw on support from their networks and are more likely to be able to organize and carry out large-scale acts of violence. Some European states have repatriated individuals, mainly women and children, from camps in Syria. On one occasion, in December 2021, Switzerland repatriated two minors. The decision of the Federal Council in March 2019 not to carry out any repatriations of adult jihadist-motivated travellers remains in force.

There is currently no sign of a new jihad area to attract future jihadist-motivated travellers from Western countries. The isolated cases of travel from Europe to jihad areas usually involve individuals with ethnic links to the conflict area concerned. ‘Islamic State’s call for hijra to Africa met with little response in Europe. Hijra – literally emigration – refers in this context to jihadist-motivated travel. While the occasional individual with an intent to embark on a jihadist-motivated journey could be observed, no actual departures of this kind from Switzerland have been detected since 2017.

In the stream of refugees caused by the war against Ukraine, several dozen suspected jihadists have entered Western European states, where they are under observation by the security authorities. A few people who were under close investigation due to possible links to terrorism have also entered Switzerland.

JIHADIST AND ETHNO-NATIONALIST TERRORISM

What does the FIS see?

Counterterrorism

Twice a year, the FIS publishes figures relating to counterterrorism – individuals assessed as posing a risk, jihadist-motivated travellers, jihad monitoring – on its website.

www.vbs.admin.ch (Sicherheit / Nachrichtenbeschaffung / Terrorismus) available in German, French and Italian
JIHADIST AND ETHNO-NATIONALIST TERRORISM

What does the FIS see?

PKK

The PKK (Kurdistan Workers’ Party) is conducting a primarily non-violent campaign in Europe for the recognition of Kurdish identity in the Kurdish-populated areas of Türkiye, Syria and Iran. In Switzerland, it raises funds, engages in propaganda, indoctrinates its supporters and recruits new members for its cadre structure in Europe and for the fight in the Kurdish-populated areas. Violent clashes with Turkish nationalists or supporters of Turkish President Erdogan also occur in Switzerland. Turkish missions and institutions such as clubhouses and mosques are all potential PKK targets.

LEBANESE HEZBOLLAH

Hezbollah maintains a network of a few dozen people from the Shiite Lebanese diaspora community in Switzerland who support the organisation. In November 2022, the Federal Council decided against banning Hezbollah in Switzerland, partly because the existing laws are adequate for detecting and penalising their illegal activities. Terrorist attacks by Hezbollah are currently highly unlikely in Switzerland; these would be directed against nationals or interests of states which Hezbollah regards as hostile.
CONTINUOUSLY DIFFUSE TERRORIST THREAT

The terrorist threat remains elevated. However, it is becoming more diffuse, as it emanates increasingly from perpetrators who are seldom in direct contact with jihadist groups active in conflict areas. While the perpetrators are often jihadist-inspired, psychological problems or personal crises are often significant factors in provoking individuals to commit acts of violence.

The greatest threat continues to emanate from jihadist-inspired lone perpetrators acting autonomously, whose motivation can rarely be clearly determined and who carry out spontaneous acts of violence using everyday items such as knives or vehicles. The use of firearms or explosives also remains a realistic possibility. Most at risk are poorly protected targets such as large gatherings of people and public transport spaces. Realistic threat scenarios include attacks on religious meeting places, security forces, politicians and representatives of social minorities.

‘ISLAMIC STATE’ AND AL-QAEDA

‘Islamic State’ continues to pose a significant terrorist threat to Europe, in that its online propaganda may inspire supporters acting autonomously to carry out terrorist attacks in Western countries. Such countries might include Switzerland. ‘Islamic State’ remains committed to planning or carrying out attacks in Europe. The capabilities of the core organisation of ‘Islamic State’ in Syria and Iraq to do so will likely remain weakened in the years to come. However, one of its affiliates, Islamic State Khorasan Province in Afghanistan, has shown increasing dynamics since 2022, rather likely to have an impact on the terrorist threat situation in Europe in the next few years. The most likely scenario is one in which radicalised individuals are inspired to commit acts of violence in Europe.

The latent threat emanating from al-Qaeda remains rooted in its desire to attack Western targets. Al-Qaeda will likely continue to benefit from the rule of the Taliban and to be able to use Afghanistan as a strategically important area of operations.

The affiliates of and regional groups associated with the two terrorist organisations, especially in South Asia and in West and East Africa, are still able and willing, despite their primarily regional focus, to carry out attacks on Western targets or to abduct nationals of Western states when the opportunity presents itself. Conditions on the ground make it possible for these regional groupings to continue operating and in some cases, primarily in Africa, to expand. Even though Switzerland is not a priority target, Swiss nationals, organisations and companies may become victims of terrorist violence.
MANY AND VARIED RISK FACTORS

All adult jihadist-motivated travellers with links to Switzerland who are being detained in Syria pose a threat to Switzerland’s security. The level of this threat depends on the fate of the detainees – whether they remain in detention, are repatriated or manage to escape. Prolonged detention may increase their radicalisation and their resentment towards Switzerland. If they break out of the prison or camp, they might return to Switzerland undetected. There is also the possibility that individuals repatriated to neighbouring countries or to regions further afield such as the Western Balkans or the Maghreb might one day come to Switzerland.

The increase in the number of released jihadists and individuals who have been radicalised during their time in captivity presents a permanent risk factor for the whole of Europe. Released prisoners sometimes return to their former milieu and spread their jihadist ideas. This has also been observed in Switzerland.

Migration to Europe persists. Individuals with links to terrorism are exploiting the migration movements in order to reach Europe and possibly also Switzerland. While the war in Ukraine and the associated impacts will not lead to a direct increase in the terrorist threat, the exploitation of the stream of refugees fleeing Ukraine by jihadists from various regions is a risk factor affecting the terrorist threat in Europe – and in Switzerland.
ISLAMIST MOVEMENT IN SWITZERLAND

A threat to the security of Switzerland may in the future rise out of the currently disparate and little organised Islamist scene in Switzerland. Individual actors who are prepared to use violence come to our attention primarily through their involvement in propaganda, but also through their logistical and financial support activities. Jihadist propaganda continues to proliferate in cyberspace. It still has considerable potential to cause damage and encourages the emergence of sympathiser networks in Switzerland and also beyond our borders. Among young people, in particular, it is thus increasingly possible for radicalisation processes to occur without any face-to-face contact taking place. Socially isolated and psychologically unstable individuals, in particular, might become radicalised and be inspired to use violence. This could be triggered by events perceived as being Islamophobic. Developments abroad also affect Islamist circles here, which have close links to the Western Balkans, in particular, via their diaspora communities.

PKK

The PKK will continue to pursue its strategy in Europe: it is generally speaking renouncing violence in Europe and hopes that this will lead to its removal from the EU list of terrorist organisations. In Switzerland, the PKK will remain actively engaged in indoctrination, recruitment, financing and propaganda. Its recruitment efforts primarily aim to assure the new generation of cadres to carry out the party’s work in Europe. Despite its general renunciation of violence, it is likely that provocations or specific events will on occasion lead to violent protests and clashes. Increased numbers of these might be triggered by events held to mark the centenary of the Treaty of Lausanne on 24 July, 2023.

HEZBOLLAH

The threat from Lebanese Hezbollah in Europe and thus also in Switzerland stems from the tensions on the one hand between Israel and Hezbollah, and on the other hand between Iran and states it regards as hostile.

Circumstances which Hezbollah might see as justifying an attack do not currently apply. However, the threat from Hezbollah could escalate rapidly.
VIOLENT EXTREMISM
RIGHT-WING EXTREMISM

The main activities of violent right-wing extremist groups continue to be meetings and gatherings, excursions and poster campaigns. Violence was used on five occasions in 2022. For example, a known member of a violent right-wing extremist group attacked an individual at random and struck them multiple times in the face. The Junge Tat group also caused damage to property during one of its actions. In the other three incidents identified, right-wing extremists were using violence to defend themselves after having been attacked during their activities.

Glorification of Nazism and hatred of foreigners and minorities, as well as anti-Semitism, are typical of the violent right-wing extremist scene; its exponents espouse the ‘great replacement’ theory. The younger generation, in particular, is interested in martial arts and sport shooting and is active in physical fitness training. Especially Junge Tat is also drawn to high-profile current issues, basing its actions on them and exploiting them for its public campaigns.

In Switzerland, right-wing extremist ideas, packaged in propaganda which glorifies violence, are disseminated on social networks, away from the public eye. The ideas – for example linked to the writings of James Mason or to accelerationism – are shared on platforms and channels or in diverse short-lived groups.

Online, as in the case of established groups in Switzerland, numerous contacts abroad have been recorded, both between groups and at a personal or friendship level.

LEFT-WING EXTREMISM

As far as violent left-wing extremism is concerned, the total number of incidents and the number of incidents involving violence have remained stable. Violent left-wing extremists organise demonstrations, deliberately damage property, carry out arson attacks, set off improvised explosive devices and use physical violence. The targets of physical attacks are primarily individuals perceived to be right-wing extremists or, at demonstrations, the security forces.

Violent left-wing extremist groups are continuing activities labelled as anti-fascist. They are increasing pressure on individuals they see as belonging to the right-wing extremist movement. To this end, they are running ‘outing’ campaigns, they damage property at the individuals’ places of residence and in some cases physically attack the individuals themselves. In the city of Bern, violent left-wing extremists have revived the ‘anti-fascist march’: after years without any demonstrations of this kind, they gathered around 1,700 people and caused property damage estimated at around 10,000 francs. Such ‘anti-fascist demonstrations’ have also taken place elsewhere.
Violent left-wing extremists remain strongly committed to the Kurdish cause. In Switzerland, as in the rest of Europe, their support takes the form of campaigns. These are targeted against companies or institutions which are alleged to support Türkiye or the war against the Kurdish people. They include demonstrations and information events aimed at bringing this issue to the attention of a wider public.

Violent left-wing extremists maintain close links to like-minded groups and individuals abroad. In campaigns and demonstrations, they take up international issues such as ‘solidarity with prisoners’.

Demonstration against the eviction from the Koch Areal, Zurich, 18 February 2023
SINGLE-ISSUE EXTREMISM

The activities of Covid extremists and animal rights extremists are currently dealt with under the umbrella term ‘violent single-issue extremism’.

In the past, a correlation has been observed between the pandemic measures and the activities of violent Covid extremists in Switzerland. It is extremely likely that this link will continue for as long as these groups view the reintroduction of pandemic measures as a realistic prospect. After the measures to combat the Covid-19 pandemic were relaxed and eventually lifted completely in February 2022, there was a sharp fall in the activities of violent Covid extremists. A hard core remains active primarily online and has turned its attention to a broader range of issues – such as the war against Ukraine, the Ukraine Recovery Conference, the World Health Organisation and the World Economic Forum. So far there are no indications that they are active within the framework of an international network.

With regard to animal rights extremism, only a few incidents involving violence have been recorded. After a brief peak in their activities and violent actions in 2018, they are now scarcely using violence at all.

Violent-extremism-motivated incidents reported to the FIS since 2016 (excluding graffiti)
RIGHT-WING EXTREMISM

Among violent right-wing extremist groups, the potential for violence will remain stable in the next few years. Their motivation to actually make use of this potential will, however, increase in the wake of frequent denunciations and a number of attacks on their physical integrity. Thanks to professional and efficient advertising by some groups, their recruitment potential and appeal are also growing.

LEFT-WING EXTREMISM

It is extremely likely that violent left-wing extremists will remain particularly committed to anti-fascism and the Kurdish cause. In the years to come, carrying out demonstrations and causing damage to property will remain their primary forms of action. Actions – with or without the use of violence – against persons they consider to be right-wing extremists are also expected to continue. This expectation is in contrast to the experience of the last few years, where there has been reluctance to use violence directed against people. However, left-wing extremists will continue to feel provoked by some right-wing extremists’ continued motivation to claim space in the public sphere and in social debates. Left-wing extremists could use this to spark interest in anti-fascism among broader sections of the population and in extreme cases might incite individuals to prepare and carry out acts of violence, in particular against people.

Additional stimuli for violent left-wing extremists will be provided by domestic as well as international developments, such as the situation in the Kurdish areas, the activities of their violent right-wing-extremist antagonists or the fate of activists imprisoned abroad.
VIOLENT EXTREMISM

What does the FIS expect?

SINGLE-ISSUE EXTREMISM

Violent Covid extremists will add further issues to their agenda. A hard core of violent Covid extremists will persist, bringing new issues to the debate in line with the latest developments. As in the debate on energy-saving measures, these will focus on issues where it can be argued that the state or a particular ‘elite’ is imposing a ‘dictatorship’. This transformation will be accompanied by a fluctuation in the number of the group’s sympathisers. It is therefore likely that violent single-issue extremist groups will emerge, with only loose ties to particular issues and characterised by a hodgepodge of ideologies and goals and a high degree of volatility.

The violent animal rights extremist movement will remain quiet in the coming years. The issue is not currently high on the agenda; the fight against global warming may be taking priority. Up until now, climate activists have made very little use of violence and for this reason have not been dealt with by the FIS, with the exception of individual cases involving violence as defined under the Intelligence Service Act. However, it is likely that some of them will become radicalised in the next few years, if their demands are not listened to in the political process. A few of these will cross the line and use violence.
TRANSITION OF VIOLENT EXTREMISM TO TERRORIST ACTIVITIES

Increasing numbers of terrorist activities motivated by right-wing extremism are being recorded abroad. Terrorist activities are defined as attempts to influence or change the institutional framework which are implemented or facilitated by committing or threatening to commit serious criminal acts or by spreading fear and terror. Terrorist attacks motivated by right-wing extremism, like those in Christchurch (New Zealand) and Halle (Germany) in 2019 or in Hanau (Germany) in 2020, could become more frequent in Europe and might possibly also occur in Switzerland.

The import of military knowledge, as obtained for example during travels in Kurdish areas, could also enable violent left-wing extremists to step up their use of violence and thus to plan terror attacks in Europe. There are currently no concrete signs of any such plans in Switzerland. The FIS prioritises responding to such threats and expects their growth in importance in the years to come.
PROLIFERATION
WAR AGAINST UKRAINE

As far as the war against Ukraine is concerned, the FIS’s main priority is to identify goods which might be put to a sanctioned military use by the warring parties, and to prevent the transfer of such goods. Russia, in particular, is forced to set up new procurement structures or to make broader use of existing structures. Companies in the states of the Eurasian Economic Union are increasingly acting as ostensible end customers for goods which then go on to Russia. Private companies are also making use of Türkiye and India in this way. For this reason, monitoring activities should be extended to regions which received little coverage in the past.

IRAN

In the nuclear dispute with Iran, the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) is now a dead letter. The parties’ main concern is to avoid paying the political price for formally terminating it themselves. Almost all the treaty’s confidence-building measures are now effectively inoperative. The Iranian nuclear programme is technically in a position to produce weapons-grade uranium for minimum deterrence within weeks. Iran has taken Russia’s side in the war against Ukraine and is supplying the aggressor with significant quantities of combat drones. Iran’s role as a supplier of arms for Russia’s war of aggression against Ukraine has increased its self-confidence in its foreign policy.

NORTH KOREA

Since 2019, North Korea has showcased a hitherto unprecedented series of missile tests; it has tested numerous ballistic missiles of all ranges, as well as cruise missiles. The range of applications has been expanded, for example to include missile launches from static underwater launch platforms – the poor man’s nuclear submarine. Key to all these tests is that they are about operational capabilities rather than development or politically-motivated symbolism. North Korea is linking its tests to symbolic dates less frequently than before. It is providing its armed forces with intensive training in the handling and operation of systems. This is clearly apparent from the North Korean exercises held in parallel with US-South Korean manoeuvres: the launches of North Korean missiles simulate attacks on the disposition of the forces used in the South’s manoeuvres. Wherever possible, a variety of operational units take part in these deployments.

Working on the hypothesis that the aim is to give practical experience to as many North Korean operational units as possible, it is likely that North Korea could have over 28 batteries of modern solid-fuel missiles. This would correspond to approximately one-third the number of similar Russian units.

As regards its nuclear weapons programme, North Korea refrained from carrying out the expected nuclear test in 2022. However, it reinforced its ‘non-negotiable’ status as a nuclear weapons state both rhetorically
and legislatively: in 2022, this principle, which has been enshrined in the constitution since 2012, was set out in law in further detail, with elements of an offensive doctrine added.

**INDIA AND PAKISTAN**

On the Indian subcontinent, rivals India and Pakistan are steadily pressing ahead with their nuclear and missile programmes. Pakistan continues to expand its uranium enrichment capabilities and is equipping its submarines with Babur nuclear-capable cruise missiles. This gives it a rudimentary second-strike capability. The Indian military, for its part, has been testing the long-range Agni-V missile. With a range of 7000 kilometres, this intercontinental missile could in principle reach any location in Europe.
WAR AGAINST UKRAINE

Russian industry needs to prepare for a prolonged phase of isolation and war economy. At the same time, the Russian leadership can probably not afford to ignore the needs of civil society. These conflicting goals of the war economy will make it difficult for Russia to establish a massive material superiority of its armed forces. Due to its structural shortcomings, especially in the area of electronics and semiconductors, Russia will attempt to acquire the necessary Western goods using its existing procurement structures, some of which date back to the Soviet era. In this context, it will focus in particular on third countries which maintain close economic ties to Russia and are willing to act as ostensible destinations in order to circumvent sanctions. There are already signs of this happening in trade with Iran, for example.

IRAN

A revival of the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action remains extremely unlikely. The Iranian leadership will seek to replace relationships with Western states by drawing closer to Russia as a partner and through cooperation with China. Iran is a nuclear threshold state, but there is no sign that Iran will cross the red line of restarting its nuclear weapons programme unless it sees itself compelled to by external circumstances. Iran’s security needs do not require it, and the likelihood of such a nuclear weapons programme being detected is too great.

NORTH KOREA

North Korea will continue with its nuclear programme and will also aim to make further progress with its missile programme. It will not be ready to enter into disarmament negotiations. It is highly likely that North Korea will carry out a nuclear weapons test in 2023; preparations on the test site have been completed. The series production of ballistic missiles for potential deployment in a Korean war seems to be satisfying the demands of the regime. This is providing the North Korean military with increasingly accurate solid-fuel missiles, which could cause significant destruction, particularly in the initial stages of an armed conflict. Third parties will probably continue to support North Korean armament in order to tie up American forces, possibly during an armed conflict over Taiwan. Should such a conflict continue for an extended period of time and escalate to the Korean Peninsula, the parties involved would reorient their industrial base.

Probability scale

- extremely
- highly
- unlikely
- rather unlikely
- rather likely
- likely
- highly likely
- extremely likely
PROLIFERATION
What does the FIS expect?
DEEP ARMAMENT

Russia’s war against Ukraine is the first war for a long time between two developed economies with a distinct industrial base. Highly intensive wars between industrial nations require an industrial base and possibly its conversion for so-called deep armament. Deep armament is the systematic orientation of a state’s economic resources, especially the means of production, to the needs of a protracted military conflict.

Deep armament classically involves the stockpiling of strategic raw materials, which these days might include semi-finished products such as certain semiconductors, and their controlled allocation to production plants. Where possible, the aim is to achieve self-sufficiency in the supply of raw materials or to control the transport routes to the sources of raw materials outside the country’s own territory. Deep armament is also characterised by a high degree of standardization of production. This is accompanied by rationalisation of production and controlled division of labour within industry. Production of unnecessary goods, for example certain consumer goods, is abandoned. The civilian means of production freed up by this are allocated to the production of related military products.

In recent times, all prolonged existential conflicts have historically been won by the side with the greater economic power which it has deployed in an uncompromising way, even where the side which initially relied on qualitative superiority (broad armament), for example Nazi Germany, achieved remarkable successes at the start. In the long term, deep armament prevails over broad armament.

The USA has experienced this in three conflicts: in the American Civil War, in the First World War and in the Second World War. American industry, supported by a largely self-sufficient internal market, was unrivalled in this respect, both qualitatively and quantitatively. China’s rise to become the ‘workshop of the world’ has changed this. While the USA continues to dominate the world of finance, the same is no longer true of manufacturing.
Modern technologies now make it possible to address the concept of deep armament more comprehensively and to develop new solutions to problems which remain the same. A key problem with deep armament – particularly in the initial phase – lies in detecting and avoiding bottlenecks. Such bottlenecks might include the availability of raw materials, logistics, the wrong ratio of suppliers to end producers or in particular a lack of (qualified) manpower. It is an advantage here if a state is able not just to guide the process by bureaucratic means but also to take direct control.

A totalitarian state has a locational advantage when it comes to preparing for deep armament. For example, a state which has introduced a social credit system can decide on a more individual basis who remains in the production process and who is conscripted into the forces. If a state project for the convergence – or fusion – of military and civilian capabilities is already in place in peacetime, then preparations will already have been made for the conversion of civilian production to benefit military projects in the event of a conflict. The partners will already be familiar with one another and will be connected by a long-standing history of collaboration.

Artificial intelligence, backed by the gradually emerging opportunities provided by quantum computers, is also ideally suited for process optimisation, if the relevant data is provided on a continuous basis. This makes it possible in principle for the entire national production chain to be optimised responsively to suit the specified goals.

In the early phase of deep armament, a liberal, democratic state has to weigh up security against freedom when ordering drastic measures which intrinsically run counter to its own values. Its industry and its national resources in general are less prepared for the eventuality of armed conflict. The conversion of the country’s potential to meet the needs of a prolonged conflict may therefore take longer. Where economies are of similar strength, this can be a major disadvantage.
ILLEGAL INTELLIGENCE
CONTINUING HIGH ESPIONAGE THREAT

The threat posed to Switzerland by espionage remains high. As previously, it comes mainly from state actors and in particular from the intelligence services of Russia and China.

While the Russian intelligence services which operate abroad continue to pose the main threat in terms of espionage, their capabilities were undermined in many European states and in North America in 2018 (response to the attempted murder of Sergei Skripal) and in 2022 (response to the war against Ukraine), in some cases significantly. Large numbers of Russian intelligence officers working under diplomatic cover were expelled. In Switzerland, however, their numbers remain stable. Of the approximately 220 individuals accredited to the Russian diplomatic and consular missions in Geneva and Bern as diplomatic or technical/administrative personnel, it is highly likely that, as before, at least one-third are working for the Russian intelligence services. In Europe, Switzerland is one of the states with the highest numbers of Russian intelligence officers operating under diplomatic cover, in part due to its role as host to international organisations.

China has dozens of intelligence officers working under diplomatic or consular cover in Switzerland. However, it has far fewer such officers than Russia, even though China employs more staff in its diplomatic and consular missions. It is highly likely that the Chinese intelligence services make greater use of non-diplomatic cover than the Russian services do. Their personnel mainly work under cover as scientists, journalists or business people.

SHORT FILM ON THE SUBJECT OF ‘INDUSTRIAL ESPIONAGE IN SWITZERLAND’

Available on the internet (in German with French and Italian subtitles):
www.vbs.admin.ch (DE / Sicherheit / Nachrichtenbeschaffung / Wirtschaftsspionage)
www.vbs.admin.ch (FR / Sécurité / Recherche de renseignements / Espionnage économique)
www.vbs.admin.ch (IT / Sicurezza / Acquisizione di informazioni / Spionaggio economico)
RUSSIAN ESPIONAGE IN TIMES OF WAR AND CONFLICT

The Russian leadership’s war of aggression against Ukraine has made the work of its intelligence services more important, but at the same time has made it harder for them to operate. Sanctions, travel and visa restrictions, expulsions of diplomatic staff and a general heightened mistrust have, on the one hand, increased the need to procure goods and information via intelligence channels. On the other hand, these consequences of the war have made the circumstances for Russian espionage in Europe more difficult:

▪ In some states, the majority of Russian intelligence service personnel were forced to leave. It is extremely likely that those intelligence officers who have been declared persona non grata and expelled will not be able to be deployed in continental Europe in the next few years. Their knowledge of the respective countries and languages will not be easy to replace.

▪ In cases when remaining intelligence officers responsible for source handling masquerade as Russian diplomats, they face increasing levels of mistrust. It is therefore highly likely that it has become harder for them to recruit new sources. Some of the existing sources may have been deterred by the war and will have decided to be less involved or to distance themselves from their source handlers.

▪ Travel and visa restrictions have also increased costs for the Russian intelligence services. The cancellation of direct scheduled flights between Russian and European cities has meant that travel to Schengen states is largely possible only via circuitous routes. Furthermore, the Schengen area has withdrawn the visa waiver for stays of up to three months for persons with Russian diplomatic passports. This means that even intelligence service personnel with diplomatic passports are no longer able to enter the Schengen area visa-free.

On the other hand, the war is opening up opportunities for the Russian intelligence services to smuggle more of their own employees into Europe as refugees. The large number of refugees is likely making it possible for some members of the intelligence services to travel undetected and be admitted on a temporary basis. However, having been smuggled in as refugees they generally do not have the same levels of access and do not move in the same circles as individuals with diplomatic accreditation. Therefore, they are not a useful replacement, at least not in the first few years.
IRAN’S APPROACH TO ITS DIASPORA COMMUNITY

Besides the war against Ukraine, the protest movement in Iran has also had an impact on espionage in Europe. The Iranian intelligence services have long been conducting surveillance on nationals who have fled the country and who are deemed to be influential. Many of these refugees have been living in Europe, including Switzerland, for years or even decades. Iranian surveillance of these diaspora communities may have been intensified yet again following the latest wave of protests. Most of the activities of the Iranian services in Europe are highly likely targeted at the diaspora communities and the missions of actors it classifies as enemies – among them Israel.

OTHER COVERT ACTIVITIES OF FOREIGN POWERS

The Russian, Chinese and Iranian intelligence services, together with a number of others, are known to engage not only in espionage but also in a wide range of other activities. These include harassment and intimidation of opposition activists or embassy officials, political interference, the procurement of critical goods, some of which are subject to sanctions, abductions, attacks and acts of sabotage. With the lengthening duration of the war in Ukraine and the deterioration of relations with Europe, Russia’s reluctance to carry out more and increasingly violent covert operations in Europe is highly likely to diminish. The Russian intelligence services will probably not always carry out such operations themselves. It is likely that Russian services will in some cases merely direct or outsource the use of violence. It will be left to non-state actors friendly to Russia to carry it out. These may be linked to violent extremism, terrorism or organised crime.

The activities of the Chinese and Iranian services in Europe are targeted mainly at the respective diaspora communities. Surveillance of their communities is likely more important to both these countries than it is to Russia. The surveillance, monitoring and influencing of Chinese abroad is the task of the state and the Communist Party of China. In Switzerland and elsewhere, this is done not only through official channels but also through the active participation of many Chinese political, economic and cultural associations and organisations. These same networks are also used by the Chinese security forces (police or intelligence services) for intelligence purposes.

With regard to covert activities in Switzerland by foreign powers, the FIS is quickly confronted with its legal limits. It regularly receives information which points less to espionage than, for example, to influence activities. In most cases, it is not allowed to investigate this evidence if it relates to the territory of Switzerland and has no direct link to illegal intelligence.
SWITZERLAND ON THE UN SECURITY COUNCIL

The espionage threat to multilateral organisations and negotiations is generally assessed as high. The UN, its organs – in particular the Security Council – and the missions accredited there are among the actors particularly affected by this threat. It therefore seems extremely likely that Switzerland’s appointment to a seat on the UN Security Council for 2023/2024 will exacerbate the espionage threat to Swiss individuals, organisations and administrative units working within the framework of the UN and its organs. This is highly likely to affect individuals responsible for UN Security Council dossiers and topics and who are involved in making and presenting decisions in committees and to the outside world. However, it is highly likely that only a small number of states will pose such a threat. Most states represented in the UN have neither the capability nor the intention to monitor Swiss entities continuously, systematically and intensively.

RUSSIAN, IRANIAN AND CHINESE ESPIONAGE

The FIS does not anticipate any major changes in the coming years in the numbers of espionage actors or in their reconnaissance targets or the methods they employ. It will remain difficult for Russia to operate in most Western states. In Switzerland, however, the Russian intelligence services will highly likely have more room for manoeuvre due to the large number of personnel on Swiss territory. However, the opportunities for Russian espionage activities and to a certain extent their scale will
also depend on decisions made by Western governments. The latter may impose sanctions which will also affect the Russian services. As a result of this, the Russian services may increasingly find themselves forced to disguise their officers as citizens of other countries, to recruit non-Russian agents and to work together with the intelligence services of states friendly to or dependent on Russia.

The social unrest and violence associated with developments in Iran indicate that Iranian espionage in Europe will tend to increase, unless it is weakened by sanctions similar to those put in place against Russia. Based on experience to date, it is important to the Iranian leadership to identify and monitor individuals at home and abroad who they feel might pose a threat to the regime.

In the shadow of the war against Ukraine and the protests in Iran, both of which have attracted much media attention, the risk of Chinese espionage activities proliferating in Europe remains. It is probable that the potential for Chinese espionage is far from exhausted. The Chinese services have enormous technical, human and financial resources at their disposal. With China’s growing power and importance in the international environment, together with the increasing trend toward polarisation into blocs, these will become more important and will be exploited accordingly. It is therefore highly likely that Chinese espionage activities in Switzerland will increase over the years.

The ongoing digitalisation means that more and more data is being transmitted and processed. Intelligence services worldwide are following this trend. Therefore, in the years to come, many intelligence services will rely increasingly on capabilities based on machine learning and artificial intelligence in order to be able to process large quantities of data efficiently. For states governed by democracy and the rule of law, this means among other things that there is an urgent need for legislators and supervisory bodies to take a detailed look at the use of these capabilities.

Intelligence services will also tend to invest even more in their technological capabilities, in order to acquire data at home and abroad. Their primary targets will likely be entities which manage particularly large volumes of sensitive data. Traditionally, these include financial service providers, state administrations and critical infrastructure operators, but also businesses such as hotels. Additional targets are technology firms which provide social media, communication services, search engines or even the digital monitoring of people’s personal property and which collect information on users as they do so.
Espionage attack vectors and targets in Switzerland

Combination of attack vectors:
- HUMINT
- OSINT
- COMINT/SIGINT
- Cyber attacks

Probability scale:
- Extremely
- Highly
- Unlikely
- Rather
- Likely
- Highly
- Extremely

Situation Report of the Federal Intelligence Service
THREAT TO CRITICAL INFRASTRUCTURE
TWO DEVELOPMENTS IN THE CYBERSPHERE

With regard to the threat to and security of critical infrastructure in the cybersphere, there are currently two key developments influencing the threat situation:

- The war in Ukraine represents a threat with partially global implications for critical infrastructure. Critical infrastructure outside the war zone could also be affected, at least indirectly.

- It is possible that operators of critical infrastructure will fall victim to ransomware attacks with increasing frequency. At the same time, the exposition to attacks will increase, because interconnectivity and the complexity of supply chains are growing.

CYBER LESSONS FROM THE WAR AGAINST UKRAINE

Although the war against Ukraine has had little impact on the cyberspace of Switzerland or other states, we can draw certain lessons from it for 2023. The war has shown where cyber can be used as a tool and where the limits lie:

- In the war against Ukraine, cyber is used chiefly for information operations or for tactical attacks on means of communication used primarily for military purposes.

- Cyber attacks accompany kinetic attacks in order to strengthen their impact. For example, cyber tools can be used to temporarily disrupt the communications or infrastructure of emergency services in the target area, in order to slow down the follow-up assistance.

Cyber attacks by hacktivists during the first year of war (DDoS)
However, broad-based cyber attacks on infrastructure have little lasting effect in conflict: bombs are often more efficient. It is also hard to control the collateral damage caused by IT-based attacks. Moreover, there is the risk of so-called spillover effects, i.e. uncontrolled spread. With the exception of a few incidents at the beginning of the invasion, this has not occurred so far. Physical attacks, on the other hand, have been observed, for example on submarine cables and the Nord Stream pipeline. Clear attribution is often difficult or not possible at all in such cases, particularly where incidents take place outside the war zone.

As far as intelligence is concerned, however, activities will continue to increase. Depending on the interests of the attacker, such activities might also target critical infrastructure operators. This is typically due to the attacker’s increased need for information about the opposing side, but may also be used as a compensatory measure by the attacker where there has been a reduction in the number of intelligence staff deployed in the target countries.

In the interest of the warring parties, groups have formed which defend their own infrastructure but whose principal aim is to inflict damage on the opposing side in the cybersphere. Ukraine has issued an official appeal for volunteers to join the IT Army of Ukraine. At the same time, pro-Russia groups such as KillNet have formed. These non-state actors will continue in future to present a threat to e.g. critical infrastructure, as they are not always under the direct control of one of the two warring parties and consequently operate based on their own target identification.
Overview of Russian cyber attacks on Ukraine

2022

Russian cyber attacks on Ukraine
- 21.11.2022: Sandworm - Prestige
  Wiper used against logistics companies in Ukraine and Poland
- 08.04.2021: Sandworm - Industroyer
  Wiper, based on Industroyer from 2016, used to sabotage power supply distribution stations
- 13.01.2022: Unknown - WhisperGate / WhisperKill
  Wiper targeting satellite internet receivers. Collateral damage in neighbouring countries
- 24.01.2022: Sandworm - AcidRain
  Wiper targeting satellite internet receivers. Collateral damage in neighbouring countries
- 22.02.2022: Unknown - FoxBlade / HermeticWiper / HermeticRansom / PartyTicket
  Wiper against critical infrastructure

Sandworm - VPNFilter
Attack on chlorine distillation system via infected Internet of Things devices

Sandworm - NotPetya
Self-spreading ransomware

Sandworm - BadRabbit
Manually installed ransomware

Sandworm - Industroyer
Attack on electricity supply

Sandworm - BlackEnergy
Attack on electricity supply

APT38 - CyberBerkut
DDoS and influencing activity in response to Yanukovych's electoral defeat

2014

RANSOMWARE ATTACKS

At the beginning of the war against Ukraine, a temporary fall in the number of reports of ransomware attacks on companies and critical service providers was observed across the board. There were probably two main reasons for this:

- Groups containing both Russian and Ukrainian members fell out; in some cases, their members even attacked one another.

- Various groups began to become involved in the war, so were otherwise occupied.

In the second quarter of 2022, the number of financially motivated ransomware attacks began to rise again. In some cases, the perpetrators achieved their goal, for example in the case of the attack on the government in Costa Rica or that on a community in Germany. Both times, a state of emergency had to be declared. The increase in such attacks shows that groups who use ransomware attacks to try to get money have meanwhile reformed and consolidated. The number of attacks is now returning to the level it was at before the war against Ukraine. The investigations of the law enforcement authorities are hampered, particularly as regards the possible punishment of offences, where the perpetrators are located in Russia.
INCREASED THREAT TO CRITICAL INFRASTRUCTURE

The threat to critical infrastructure from criminal groups seeking to use ransomware and the tapping of sensitive data as a means of obtaining money remains elevated. Such groups generally select their victims opportunistically, exploiting any opportunities which present themselves. They give little thought to the possible consequences of the failure of critical infrastructure. Experience shows that they will concentrate on sectors which are already under strain due to the situation, such as the energy sector.

Advancing digitalisation, especially in supply chains, is effectively opening up new opportunities for criminal or state actors to attack critical infrastructure operators, in particular. In connection with the war against Ukraine, a direct threat to Switzerland for the purposes of sabotage remains highly unlikely. However, the threat of attacks by criminal actors, which could also lead to disruptive results, remains high.

IMPACT OF THE WAR AGAINST UKRAINE

Possible spillover effects of individual state actions in the context of the war against Ukraine will lead indirectly to an increased threat to critical infrastructure. Swiss critical infrastructure is not the main target here, but dependencies could lead to the disruption, partial failure or temporary restriction of critical services. A direct threat in connection with the war in Ukraine remains highly unlikely.

The activities of non-state actors engaged in the war are still the main problem. The threat and the unpredictability which such activities give rise to should not be underestimated, even if these actors have so far attracted more attention by announcing their intentions than by carrying them out.

As part of various international efforts, notably within the framework of the UN, OSCE and other organisations, Switzerland has for years been campaigning for states to observe standards of responsible conduct in the cybersphere. This includes the primacy of due diligence, which means that states may not allow their territory to be used for criminal or state attacks on critical infrastructure and that they must take action to counter such attacks. In the light of the challenges and threats to critical infrastructure from state and non-state actors, the observance of such standards and insistence on them will remain a focal point.

It remains to be seen how states will react if such a group causes damage to critical infrastructure. Although not officially conflict parties, these groups are at
least indirectly involved in events in the war, and in some cases it is unclear how independently they are actually acting. This makes clear attribution of responsibility difficult and might lead to incorrect apportionment of blame or to escalation. NATO has declared that a successful cyber attack on critical infrastructure of a member state could trigger collective defence commitments based on Article 5 of the North Atlantic Treaty.

**KINETIC ATTACKS ON CRITICAL INFRASTRUCTURE REMAIN A POSSIBILITY**

The fact that financial motives are generally behind the cyber attacks which have been recorded does not exclude other motives. Motives relating to violent extremism, terrorism, intelligence activities or power politics are also possible. Correspondingly, the perpetrators’ aims will be different and may go as far as sabotage. Cyber attacks are not the only threat to critical infrastructure. Physical attacks, for all the motives mentioned, are also a possibility.
KEY FIGURES 2022
We make a significant contribution to the early detection of threats to Switzerland’s security and to decision-making in the field of security policy, to the protection of Switzerland's internal and external security and to the safeguarding of international security interests.
SITUATION ASSESSMENTS

Switzerland needs the FIS because...
... the FIS identifies the major threats facing Switzerland and reports on them.

Recipients of the FIS’s situation assessments included the Federal Council as well as other political decision-makers and relevant authorities at the federal and cantonal levels, military decision-makers and the law enforcement agencies. The FIS provides them periodically, spontaneously or with regards to certain schedules, either upon request or on its own initiative, with information and findings, either in written or verbal form, covering all areas of the Intelligence Service Act (ISA) and the FIS’s classified mission statement.
OFFICIAL REPORTS

Switzerland needs the FIS because...
... the FIS provides unclassified information to the relevant authorities for use in criminal and administrative proceedings.

In 2022, for example, it delivered 17 official reports to the Office of the Attorney General and 17 to other federal authorities such as the Federal Office of Police, the State Secretariat for Migration or the State Secretariat for Economic Affairs (excluding supplements to existing official reports).

INTERNATIONAL COOPERATION

Switzerland needs the FIS because...
... the FIS cooperates with foreign authorities that perform duties as defined by the ISA. To this end, the FIS also represents Switzerland in international bodies.

The FIS exchanges intelligence with over a hundred partner services from various states and with international organisations, including the relevant institutions at the UN and the EU dealing with security issues.

---

**Official reports submitted to federal authorities by topic**

- Terrorism
- Violent extremism
- Illegal intelligence
- Proliferation
- Reports not exclusively linked to one of these topics

Total 34

---

**Exchange of information with partner services**

- Messages received from foreign partner services in connection with FIS tasks
- Messages sent to foreign partner services

6930

14 920
AWARENESS-RAISING PROGRAMME

Switzerland needs the FIS because...
... the FIS, working together with the cantons, runs programmes for raising awareness of illegal activities relating to espionage and proliferation.

As part of the Prophylax awareness-raising programme, the FIS liaises with companies. Within the framework of the Technopol awareness-raising module, the FIS engages in similar work with universities, research institutions and federal offices.

Briefings and awareness briefings
Total 99

- Briefings and awareness briefings with companies
- Awareness briefings with institutions of higher education, etc.
- Further awareness briefings

Five challenges facing intelligence services

- Ability to learn and adapt
- Complex international environment
- Exponential technological progress
- Evolution of the legal framework
- Transformation of the traditional intelligence service professions
- Agile organisational management methods
INTELLIGENCE-GATHERING MEASURES REQUIRING AUTHORISATION

Switzerland needs the FIS because...
...the FIS can use intelligence-gathering measures requiring authorisation in cases presenting a particularly serious threat in the areas of terrorism, illegal intelligence, proliferation, attacks on critical infrastructure or the protection of other important national interests as defined under Article 3 ISA.

Intelligence-gathering measures requiring authorisation are regulated under Article 26 et seq ISA: the measures must in each case be authorised by the Federal Administrative Court and approved by the head of the Federal Department of Defence, Civil Protection and Sport following consultation with the head of the Federal Department of Foreign Affairs and the head of the Federal Department of Justice and Police.

Intelligence-gathering measures requiring authorization are valid for a maximum of three months. Before the authorised period expires, the FIS can submit a substantiated application for an extension of the authorisation for up to three more months. The measures are subject to close monitoring by the Independent Oversight Authority for Intelligence Activities as well as by the Control Delegation.

### Authorised and approved measures

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Area of activity (art. 6 ISA)</th>
<th>Operations</th>
<th>Measures</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Terrorism</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Illegal intelligence</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>71</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NBC proliferation</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Attacks on critical infrastructure</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>18</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td><strong>4</strong></td>
<td><strong>92</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### Individuals affected by these measures

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Category</th>
<th>Number</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Targets</td>
<td>12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Third persons (as defined under Art. 28 ISA)</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Unknown persons (e.g. only phone number known)</td>
<td>13</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td><strong>26</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Counting method

- In the case of measures, an authorised and approved extension (which can be granted several times for a maximum of three months each time) is counted as a new measure, as it had to be requested and justified anew following the proper procedure.
- Operations and individuals affected, on the other hand, are counted only once for each year, even when measures have been extended.
The ISA has also given the FIS the power to conduct cable communication intelligence in order to gather information about security-relevant events abroad (Art. 39 ff. ISA).

As the purpose of cable communication intelligence is to gather information about other countries, it is not designed as a domestic intelligence-gathering measure requiring authorisation.

However, cable communication intelligence can be conducted only with the obligation of Swiss telecommunications service providers to forward relevant signals to the Swiss Armed Forces’ Centre for Electronic Operations. The ISA therefore provides under Article 40 f. an authorisation and approval procedure for orders to the providers, which is similar to that for intelligence-gathering measures requiring authorisation.

At the end of 2022, 3 cable communication intelligence orders were being processed.

Radio communication intelligence is also directed at foreign countries (Art. 38 ISA), meaning that only radio systems located abroad may be recorded. In practice, this relates primarily to telecommunication satellites and shortwave transmitters.

In contrast to cable communication intelligence, radio communication intelligence is not subject to authorisation, because in the case of the latter, it is not necessary to oblige telecommunications service providers to record data.

At the end of 2022, 30 radio communication intelligence orders were being processed.
SCREENINGS BY THE FOREIGN CITIZEN’S SERVICE AND REQUESTS FOR ENTRY BANS

Switzerland needs the FIS because... … the FIS screens selected individuals from abroad for possible threats to the country’s internal security.

If the FIS considers that the individual concerned poses a potential risk, it may recommend that the application be denied. It may also submit reservations to the competent authorities, i.e. the Federal Department of Foreign Affairs, the State Secretariat for Migration or the Federal Office of Police, depending on the request involved.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Request for accreditation of diplomats and international officials</th>
<th>Total number of screenings</th>
<th>Rejection recommended</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Visa applications</td>
<td>6095</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Applications for work and residence permits required under the law on foreign nationals</td>
<td>713</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Asylum seekers’ dossiers</td>
<td>45 147</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Applications for naturalisation</td>
<td>1 106 917</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Records as part of the Schengen visa consultation procedure Vision</td>
<td>2 272 799 Personen auf 14 071 Flügen</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

API data that does not yield any matches with the data held by the FIS is deleted after a processing period of 96 hours.
Personal security screenings are a preventive measure to safeguard Switzerland’s internal security and protect its population. They are targeted at persons performing sensitive functions with access to classified information, material or facilities.

On behalf of the Federal Chancellery and the Special Service for Personnel Security Investigation at the DDPS, the FIS conducts verifications abroad and undertakes in-depth assessments of individuals recorded in its information and storage systems.

Of the 297 entry bans to Switzerland that the FIS submitted to the Federal Office of Police to protect Switzerland’s security, 283 were issued. 14 were still being processed at the end of 2022. No requests were returned to the FIS.
TRANSPARENCY

In 2022, a total of 675 requests for information based on Article 63 ISA and Article 8 Federal Act on Data Protection were received. In addition, 2 inquiries regarding previous requests were submitted. A total of 594 applicants who had filed a request were provided with complete information on whether the FIS had processed data relating to them prior to the time of filing of the request and, if so, what data was involved.

In 50 cases, the answer was deferred or refused because of interests requiring the maintenance of secrecy or overriding interests of third parties (Article 63 paragraph 2 ISA and Article 9 paragraph 2 FADP).

In 13 cases, the formal requirements (such as the provision of proof of identity) for the processing of a request were not met: despite a request to provide the necessary information, 10 requests remained incomplete after a three-month period and were therefore closed without action and as at 31 December 2022 there was still time for the 3 remaining requests to be completed within the three-month deadline. At the end of 2022, 20 requests for information were still being processed.

In 2022, the FIS also received 21 requests for access under the Federal Act on Freedom of Information in the Administration (FoIA).
**STAFFING AND FINANCES**

The FIS attaches particular importance to family-friendliness and in 2016 was one of the first federal offices to be certified as a particularly family-friendly employer.

The core values of the FIS are trust, cohesion and professionalism.

The effectiveness of the service depends on its highly-qualified employees, who come from diverse professional backgrounds. Many of them regularly travel worldwide in the course of their work.

The FIS communicates in all Switzerland’s national languages. Its employees are able to understand and speak a multitude of languages. The FIS promotes the greatest possible diversity, in part as a way of optimizing team performance in the intelligence service.

**Employees**

*Total 421 (At the end 2022)*

- Female: 173
- Male: 248

**Finances**

*In millions of francs*

- Expenditure on personnel: 67.4
- Expenditure on equipment and operating expenses: 24.7
- Cantons’ intelligence service expenditures: 18

**Linguistic distribution**

*At the end 2022*

- German: 73.4%
- French: 22.7%
- Italian: 3.2%
- Romansh: 10.7%
LIST OF FIGURES

Cover page: In the Kharkiv region, Ukraine, 13 December 2022
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1 In 2023 and 2024 Switzerland serves as a non-permanent member of the UN Security Council. New York, 25 May 2023
© Keystone / Alessandro della Valle

2 Turkish drone attack near the Syrian town of Al-Qahtaniyah, 23 November 2022
© Keystone / AFP / Gihad Darwish

3 Chinese military exercise around Taiwan, 5 August 2022
© Keystone / Xinhua / Lin Jian

4 Changes in Russian territorial control during the first year of the war
Source: The Economist, Data from satellites reveal the vast extent of fighting in Ukraine, 23 February 2023

5 Condemnation of Russian aggression against Ukraine
Source: UN

6 Risk of nuclear escalation
Source: German Institute for International and Security Affairs (SWP), 1 February 2023

7 Opening ceremony of the 20th National Congress of the Communist Party of China, Beijing, 16 October 2022
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8 Trial of the perpetrator of the Morges attack, Federal Criminal Court in Bellinzona, 12 December 2022
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10 Demonstration against the eviction from the Koch Areal, Zurich, 18 February 2023
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11 Exhibition on the Iranian nuclear programme, Tehran, 8 February 2023
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