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**Federal Intelligence Service FIS**


# SWITZERLAND'S SECURITY




Situation Report 2013  
of the Federal Intelligence Service FIS




**Switzerland's Security  
2013**





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# Protecting freedom and security

By international standards, Switzerland continues to be a country which guarantees a high degree of freedom and provides a high level of security. In this respect, we are doing well and can be proud. However, this freedom and security is not a gift. We must work hard to preserve it and if need be also to defend it.

This latest situation report by the intelligence service reveals that Switzerland continues to be exposed to threats and risks, even if these are currently at a low level. Areas where Switzerland's vulnerability is increasing are indicated by recent developments such as the acceleration of social and political processes worldwide and thus also of the rate at which they are escalating, the international trend toward exerting pressure in order to enforce conformity, and the rapid increase in cyber risks in almost all areas of life. As a small state, we must stand up for our interests more forcefully today than was necessary in the past.

The Federal Government has developed a strategy in response to cyber risks which is based on a decentralised approach involving all government agencies and, most importantly, also the private sector. In doing so, it has applied to this area the tried and tested Swiss system of partnership between the community and the individual. The partnership between the state and the private sector allows us to exploit our knowledge and skills potential to the maximum. The intelligence service is another important element of our defence against cyber risks. In particular, it helps to ensure their early detection and to provide a system for national and international networking.

The task of our country's political leadership is to organise and manage the intelligence service in complete accordance with the rule of law, so that we make optimal use of its potential to contribute to the protection of freedom and security and to represent our interests internationally.

Freedom and security concern us all. By providing transparency, this report aims to promote understanding of this fact and to strengthen confidence in the intelligence service.

Federal Department of Defence,  
Civil Protection and Sport DDPS



Ueli Maurer  
President of the Swiss Confederation




## The situation report in brief

How secure is Switzerland? What should Switzerland's inhabitants be worried about, who poses a threat and what are the dangers to us? In answer to these questions, the FIS's situation radar offers an overview from the point of view of security policy; it gives the FIS's view of what the main security concerns for Switzerland are at present and which threats are currently only latent.

- No threat is so important as to be the overriding focus of attention. Looked at in the long term, and compared with very many other countries, Switzerland finds itself in a very stable and peaceful situation. Although the threats and dangers to Switzerland which have been identified are real, they could pose a threat to the state as a whole only under unfavourable conditions which at the present time do not apply.
- In the strategic environment, the European debt crisis and the Arab Spring are calling long-held certainties into question, and Russia is once again playing a more important role in dealings with Europe, particularly as an 'energy superpower'.
- Switzerland is still not a priority target for jihad-motivated attacks. However, Swiss citizens are at greater risk than before of politically- or terrorist-motivated kidnappings abroad. Especially in conflict zones in Islamic regions, they, like others, could at any time be the victims of kidnappings or of jihadist acts of violence or terror. Across Europe, jihad-motivated travel to conflict zones is still on the rise.
- The potential for violence among right- and left-wing extremists persists, but does not on the whole threaten Switzerland's internal security. The situation as regards left-wing extremism has eased slightly, and it is likely that punitive measures such as arrests and convictions have contributed to this. In right-wing extremist circles, clandestine behaviour has increased. It cannot yet be foreseen what the consequences of this will be.
- The proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and their delivery systems is one of the great problems of our time. Iran and North Korea are still the main focus of concern. The international sanctions against Iran have been tightened dramatically. This also increases the risk of attempts to circumvent them in breach of Swiss and international law.
- Illegal intelligence operations continue to be carried out in Switzerland, with IT resources increasingly often one of the means via which information is being leaked.
- Because the way in which Switzerland functions is dependent on an ever more closely interconnected network of information and communications facilities, cyber risks are rising markedly. These facilities offer many opportunities for misuse, manipulation and damage, particularly as they can be used largely anonymously and with relatively little outlay.

# Strategic environment 2013

The debt crisis in Europe and the upheaval in the wake of the Arab Spring are two major developments in Switzerland's strategic environment, the consequences of which are difficult to foresee at present. The debt crisis is placing a strain on our immediate environment, the stability of which forms the basis of our security and prosperity. The Arab world is currently going through a period of upheaval which also poses a number of challenges for Switzerland. Developments in other strategic areas currently remain stable, such as the military threat that remains of secondary importance.





## Strategic environment in a state of flux


Switzerland's strategic environment has been in a state of flux for some years. The European debt crisis and the Arab Spring have brought another year of developments which were difficult to foresee, and it is likely that there are many more years of crisis management still to come. It is not yet possible to gauge the long-term consequences of these changes everywhere.

### The debt crisis as a test of European unity

The debt crisis in Europe continues to be responsible for high levels of uncertainty. In February 2012, Greece (which, like Ireland and Portugal, had already had to ask for international assistance) was the first eurozone country to become de facto insolvent. In December, Spain – the fourth largest economy in the EU – received support by the European Stability Mechanism. In summer 2012, the European Central Bank (ECB) used one of the last arrows in its

quiver of crisis management tools by declaring its willingness to buy up government bonds. On the periphery of Europe, extremely tough adjustments to budget deficits and labour costs are now underway, in many places accompanied by street protests. Meanwhile, the European banking system is still in a bad way. It will require further state aid in order to achieve stability, but will also have to shed business, which will depress growth in Europe and probably increase unemployment still further. In addition, the highly interconnected international banking world could still become a source of worldwide infection and trigger a new financial crisis on a global scale.

In the light of the way this crisis is unfolding, the political will to defend the eurozone is currently being seriously tested. The EU institutions have shown themselves to be capable of taking action, but so far only in small steps. These do not go far enough to put an end to the crisis in one fell swoop. So far, they have been just enough to prevent the collapse of the eurozone. Overall, a politically highly controversial redistribution of the risks between taxpayers in the various countries of Europe has taken place. The problem here is that this crisis management also tends to override political processes in the member states. The EU is exerting an increasing amount of influence on political processes in the peripheral countries. The new fiscal pact for the eurozone is based on a joint decision in favour of increased cooperation, but one made



#### Situation radar tool

Since 2011, the FIS has been using a situation radar tool to describe the threats relevant to Switzerland. A simplified version of the situation radar, which does not contain any confidential data, has also been incorporated into this report. The public version lists the threats that fall within the FIS's remit, together with 'migration risks' and 'organised crime', which are also relevant from the security point of view. For more information on these two topics, which are not discussed in this report, readers are referred to the reports of the relevant federal authorities.

At right:  
Overview map – after the Arab Spring

outside the EU treaty framework. And in the meantime, the ECB is being forced into taking responsibility for fiscal policies which would traditionally have been the preserve of parliaments.

For Switzerland, as an integral part of Europe in many respects, the stabilisation of the eurozone is of great economic importance. An escalation of the debt crisis to major EU countries and their banking systems would bring with it significant risks to our own economy, and the exchange rate environment remains unfavourable. In addition, the question of the further political restructuring of the European continent is also at issue: as the EU-27 (from July 2013, following the accession of Croatia, EU-28) or increasingly as a 'multi-speed Europe', with more vigorous development of the eurozone-17 or of an even smaller core zone. This difficult process will take place against a background of empty state coffers, rising social tension and populist tendencies. Switzerland, with its small, relatively open economy, is facing increasingly fierce competition for jobs and tax revenues and finds itself under increasing pressure to conform, for example in matters of financial market regulation and tax policy.

### The third year after the Arab Spring

The Arab Spring of 2011 and its consequences will make crisis management necessary for years to come. The tidal wave of revolt has now ebbed, but far-reaching upheavals in Europe's southern neighbourhood are still ongoing, upheavals that present each country with its own challenges. In Syria, the regime is using increasingly harsh methods in the fight for its survival, which has been going on for over two years now, and has turned the power struggle into a war of attrition. This is now also having an adverse effect on the security of its neighbours Lebanon, Jordan, Iraq and Turkey. Egypt, Tunisia and Libya see themselves confronted with serious problems, primarily in the domestic political sphere, as does Yemen. Internal security is precarious everywhere, and over the last two years these governments' economic room for manoeuvre has shrunk. In many places, political Islam has shown itself to be broadly based and well organised. However, only in Egypt, it is in the process of taking over control of a functioning powerful apparatus of state, hitherto dominated by the military. Furthermore, for the time being no other countries have been caught up in the wave. In particular,



the Gulf monarchies, which are vital to global energy supplies, have (with the exception of Bahrain) so far scarcely been affected.

The outcome of these upheavals remains uncertain. The conflict in Syria is still raging. It could end in complete defeat or in temporary survival for the regime, which has been widely discredited both at home and abroad. In Egypt, Tunisia and Libya, on the other hand, open elections have given rise to new, more broadly legitimised governments, which today are under a variety of internal pressures. Switzerland supports the process of transformation in these countries. Still, it cannot remain unaffected by the risks in the southern and eastern Mediterranean region: economic development has been set back, and internal security is problematic. Weapons are now flowing in and out unchecked, and new scope is opening up for terrorist or criminal organisations. The threat to the security of our citizens and diplomatic missions in the region, terrorist threats and kidnappings, disruption of trade and of energy supplies, the task of coping with sanctions regimes and dictators' assets, as well as migration from the crisis areas, will remain significant problems for Switzerland.

### **Focus on Russia**

In Europe, following the dissolution of the Soviet Union, Russia has, to a large extent, consolidated itself internally in political, economic and to some degree also military terms. Now it is once again turning its attention more toward the outside world. The challenges this development poses for Russia and for Europe are a key topic of this report.

The long-term consequences of the changes in the strategic environment are still unclear. There are considerable risks, but also opportunities for stimulating positive development. An overview of further important issues on the FIS's radar follows.

### **Proliferation: decision year on Iran?**

The proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and their delivery systems remains one of the great problems of our time and is the subject of ever closer multilateral cooperation. At the centre of international concerns are developments in Iran, where the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) has repeatedly voiced the suspicion that Iran is not using its nuclear programme purely for civilian aims, but has for years secretly been working on the development of a nuclear weapon. Iran has still not been able to allay these suspicions. Meanwhile, the Iranian nuclear programme has reached a stage where diplomatic efforts to find a solution risk being overtaken either by military intervention or by the development of an Iranian nuclear weapon. A nuclear-armed Iran would not only have regional implications, but would in particular shake the foundations of international efforts to curb proliferation and might trigger a new nuclear arms race in the region and further afield.

Since 2012, international efforts to prevent Iran developing a nuclear weapon have once again intensified. Iran is now subject to a sanctions regime, supported by the USA, the EU and numerous other countries, which is coming close to an economic blockade. Switzerland is integral to international efforts to contain


the risks associated with proliferation. It is in compliance with all UN sanctions, but does not fully support the EU's more far-reaching measures. For example, Switzerland has not implemented sanctions adopted by the EU in 2012 against Iran's central bank and the trade in crude oil and petrochemical products from Iran. The FIS has already recorded an increase in attempts to circumvent sanctions via Switzerland. As a centre of high technology, Switzerland has a particular interest in preventing this. By doing so, it will protect its industry from the misuse of these technologies and the attendant consequences. International sanctions against Swiss companies which – knowingly or unknowingly – have breached international law have the potential to cause major systemic damage to our economy.

In addition to intensive international cooperation to combat illegal procurement attempts, the FIS continues to work closely together with cantonal and municipal police services on a prevention programme (Prophylax) aimed at raising awareness in Switzerland's business and research communities of the threat posed by proliferation and espionage, as well as by cyber attacks.

### Terrorism: evolving threats

In the fight against jihad-motivated violent extremism and terrorism, the situation is defined by two trends. Firstly, pressure on core al-Qaeda in Afghanistan and Pakistan as well as on its affiliates, particularly in the Arabian peninsula and in Somalia, remains high. Secondly, however, increased numbers of attacks have been carried out by small groups and individual perpetrators, who have often grown up in Western countries and whose actions have been inspired by al-Qaeda propaganda. The trend in jihad-motivated travel movements out of Europe toward jihadist conflict zones has become more defined. The risk of politically- or terrorist-motivated kidnappings of Swiss citizens abroad is continuing to rise.

As regards ethno-nationalist violent extremist and terrorist movements, the Kurdistan Workers' Party (PKK) is of particular concern to Switzerland. There have been numerous and repeated protests in support of the PKK across Europe. In Switzerland, too, such events take place on a regular basis, with the PKK making every effort not to be perceived as a violent group. The state of Öcalan's health will be key in determining how the situation unfolds in relation to the PKK.



There is currently little sign of activity by the successor organisations of the Tamil Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE) in Europe or in Switzerland; however, the problem of minorities in Sri Lanka remains unresolved.

### Right- and left-wing extremism

Violent extremism in Switzerland is not on a scale that poses a danger to the state. In this country, there have been scarcely any acts of violence attributable to right-wing extremism for some time now. The situation as regards left-wing extremism has also calmed down somewhat over the last twelve months. The continuing trend in right-wing extremism is the consequence of a withdrawal from the public eye: however, there is still a certain sense of unease among the security authorities about possible clandestine activities. The slight easing of the situation with regard to violent left-wing extremism, on the other hand, might be the result of tactical restraint and the preventive effects of criminal law.

### Illegal intelligence: diversity of methods

Switzerland continues to be the target of espionage, as is demonstrated by a case in which Georgian opposition figures in Switzerland were under observation by officials of the Georgian ministry of the interior. While on the one hand intelligence services still use traditional tools such as human intelligence from informants and agents and the acquisition of information on the ground, they are now also increasingly using sophisticated electronic cyber-espionage tools.

The advantage of cyber espionage for the perpetrators and those employing them is that no-one has to be present on the ground and so traditional methods of counterespionage are often ineffective. In addition, the use of electronic means makes it possible to steal large quantities of data at once or within a short time. Such cases of sophisticated electronic espionage are regularly recorded.

Swiss research is one target of illegal intelligence. It is a world leader in many areas, and Switzerland is home to a number of renowned research institutes. This makes Swiss universities, research centres and centres of excellence an attractive target for foreign intelligence services.




Paint attack on Credit Suisse bank, Zürich, 27 January 2013

### Energy security: dependence on gas imports

In times of economic crisis and political disturbance, the public becomes more acutely aware of our dependence on imported raw materials and energy. As far as Switzerland's energy security is concerned, the risks have not changed. Thanks to a well functioning international crude oil market, oil imports are readily available, even in times of increased uncertainty in the crisis areas of the Middle East. The situation as regards imports of natural gas is structurally different: there is as yet no integrated international market, and due to its reliance on fixed pipeline systems, Switzerland is heavily dependent on Russia and will increasingly be so in the near future. In the longer term, the technological revolution linked to the extraction of shale gas has the potential to speed up the development of an international natural gas market and also to have a positive impact on Switzerland's energy security.

### Military threats remain of secondary importance

Traditional military threats to our country are still assessed by the FIS as low. It is calculated that there would be an advance warning period of around ten years of any renewed development of a threat of war in Central Europe. In Russia, a promising reform of the armed forces is underway. This will produce substantial improvements in conventional capabilities, but not until around the end of the decade. By 2020, Russia will probably have the largest modern combat aircraft fleet in Europe, and Turkey the largest European combat aircraft fleet within NATO. The advance warning period regarding the use of military force on the periphery of Europe could be significantly shorter. Likewise, a threat from more distant regions, based on weapons of mass destruction and long-range delivery systems, could emerge as early as the middle of the decade.



Maintaining existing military capabilities and building up new capabilities requires a considerable amount of time. The existing long warning periods cannot absolve the state from the necessity for proactive planning. Adapting the mission, scope and operational readiness of military forces to financial conditions which are continuing to deteriorate will remain a key challenge facing security and defence policy in Europe. It will probably be difficult to avoid additional reductions of troop strengths and equipment, which can be only partly be made up for by qualitative improvements. European air forces will face capability shortfalls, despite considerable investment in combat aircraft fleets. The number of countries with no combat aircraft, and therefore without the capability to police their airspace, will increase, and this will lead to a weakening of the military security cordon around Switzerland. Increased bilateral and multilateral cooperative ventures to exploit synergies and compensate for capability shortfalls will remain an attractive proposition throughout Europe in future.

### **Cyber threats: vulnerable society**

Global digital networking has created hitherto undreamed-of possibilities, for good and for ill. The state, the economy and society all benefit from information and communication (ICT) infrastructures and access to the cybersphere (internet, mobile networks and applications, e-business, e-government, computer-based process control programmes). However, this has also led to increased dependence and susceptibility to disruptions, manipulations and attacks.

The opportunities for misusing ICT for criminal, intelligence, terrorist or military purposes or for interfering with its functions are almost unlimited, as are its positive uses. It must be assumed that the underlying trend – the increasing interconnectedness and thus also the growing complexity of ICT – will continue.

The functioning of Switzerland as an integrated system (state, economy, transport, energy supply, communication etc.) depends on an increasing number of interconnected information and communication facilities. This infrastructure is vulnerable. Prolonged or extensive disruptions and attacks could considerably impair Switzerland's technical, economic and administrative capabilities. ICT is a particularly attractive target for attacks, not just because it offers many opportunities for misuse, manipulation and damage, but also because it can be used largely anonymously and with relatively little outlay.





## Focus: Russia

In the last ten years, the Russian state has overcome a period of internal weakness and has strengthened its political, economic and social control. Now it is once again turning its attention more toward the outside world. In an increasingly multipolar world, Russia, with its huge investments in the commodities sector and in the reform of the armed forces, is aiming to be one of the dominant poles. In its dealings with Europe, Russia is already a de facto ‘energy superpower’.

### Consolidation of Russia under Putin

In May 2012, Vladimir Putin began his third term as president of Russia. Under his leadership, Russia has overcome a ten-year period of internal weakness and is now again turning its attention more toward the outside world.

Over the last decade, a highly centrally-managed state has grown up again in Russia, based economically on an immense abundance of raw materials and once again expanding its influence in the post-Soviet space. Central to this

development has been President Putin, the architect of the current regime, which simultaneously exercises control over the state and the economy. Putin’s goal is to re-establish Russia on the world stage as an ‘energy superpower’. His achievements are recognised by a majority of Russians, for whom the collapse of the Soviet Union has signified a loss of the country’s influence and self-esteem.

### Structures and modus operandi

Under Putin, the Russian apparatus of state has once again developed into an authoritarian regime that to a large extent directs political, economic and social developments. The key posts in the powerful presidential administration, in the government and in the parliament, as well as in the country’s major corporations, are occupied by loyal allies. The personnel changes at the start of his third term of office have seen a number of his closest confidants promoted, among them prominent representatives from intelligence and security service cir-



cles (referred to as ‘siloviki’), who are seen as important figures of the conservative elite, both in the domestic policy debate and on foreign policy issues. Influential oligarchs are reluctant to re-enter the political arena. They have come to recognise that, provided they submit to the Kremlin, they can instead profit substantially from its policies. Critics and political opponents are also being tied into the regime. Oppositional tendencies are being stifled at birth or, as has happened in recent times, channelled and weakened. Opponents of the system who refuse to be tied into it are being subjected to repressive measures.

It is impossible to predict what longer-term impact the protest movement which has been taking to the streets since the winter of 2011/2012 will have on the ruling regime. Within the Russian elite – from the urban middle class right up to the political leadership – a substantial debate is currently taking place on the course the country is following, about the demands of a changing, better-informed and better-off society and, once again, about reform of the economy, on the performance of which the regime depends. This debate will not necessarily lead to a course of reform that will bring it closer to European models. Under pressure, the regime might also harden its position, becoming more repressive internally or more aggressive externally or both.

### **Economic environment**

Today, Russia is one of the world’s ten largest economies. At its heart lies the energy sector. The profitable oil and gas industry is domi-

nated, cartel-like, by a few large corporations which in terms of personnel and finance are closely intertwined with the political powers. Putin began engineering control over Russia’s largest company, the energy, logistics and media concern Gazprom, as soon as he was first elected in 2000. Over the last few years, it has been the turn of the oil sector, which is being consolidated under the state-owned company Rosneft. Rosneft is expanding strategically and is likely to become one of the world’s largest energy companies. Under Putin, Russia has made substantial investments in the energy sector as the mainstay of the economy, particularly in expanding export capacity, i.e. in efficient oil and gas pipeline systems. However, the focus on the oil and gas industry is exacerbating Russia’s high degree of dependence on oil price movements. Taxation of the energy sector finances approximately half of all government expenditure.

### **Reform of the armed forces**

In addition to the energy sector, Russia is once again investing more in modernizing its armed forces. This includes leaner command structures, a new defence model and a ten-year armaments programme with a budget of over 500 billion francs. The speed of implementation and the political will behind it are what distinguish this armed forces reform from all previous attempts. Three new modular vehicle platforms are being developed for the army, while the air force is to receive 1600 new planes and helicopters and the navy will get eighty new ships and submarines. A completely new

At left:  
Overview map of Russia

departure for Russia has been the introduction of arms imports from the West. While comprehensive implementation of the reforms may be difficult to achieve and there will continue to be a lack of logistics capacity, nonetheless, by 2020 the armed forces are expected to see substantial increases in capability, and Russia will probably then have the largest fleet of modern combat aircraft in Europe. Until such time as the targeted growth in the capability of its conventional armed forces has been reached, Russia will continue to have to rely on its tactical nuclear potential in the event of any conflict with a well-organised adversary equipped with modern weapons.

### Foreign policy under Putin

After a period of domestic consolidation, Russia is now once again turning its attention more toward the outside world. One of its declared goals is to retain its place as one of the major players through its status as a permanent member of the UN Security Council. Moreover, Moscow is working to regain lost influence both in the post-Soviet space – in the Western CIS (Commonwealth of Independent States) countries, in the Caucasus and in Central Asia – and in Eastern Europe and the Balkans. Commodity companies and financial institutions form the backbone of Russian power politics in this context. Under Putin, large national corporations like Gazprom and Rosneft have been formed, not only to stand up to global competition, but also to act as instruments of power for asserting Russian interests. In recent years, Russia has built up a leading position as

a gas supplier to Europe, with power-political considerations also influencing decisions in the case of the state-owned corporation Gazprom. Russia as an ‘energy superpower’ is now a reality, at least in its dealings with Europe.

### Russia’s difficult position between the US and China

In the global power struggle, Moscow is still battling to regain the privileged position which it lost with the collapse of the Soviet Union. Vis-à-vis the West, the Russian leadership remains firmly focussed on its old chief adversary, the US, a perception which appears to have amplified since Putin’s return to the Kremlin in 2012. The US is perceived as its sole matched rival, with whom it struggles tenaciously in all areas to achieve a global strategic partnership, but one on Russian terms. Preserving the nuclear strategic balance is a key aim, which, due to the fact that many Russian systems are approaching the end of their useful life, will require enormous investment. In addition, Russia must also face up to new realities in the East. China and India are growing economically and will in future also have the capability to project power militarily through their ocean-going naval forces. Russia is under growing strategic economic pressure from China, particularly in Central Asia, one of its traditional spheres of interest. Supported by a Russian-dominated Eurasian Union, Putin is claiming a place for Russia as one of the poles in an emerging multipolar world order.

At right:  
The western post-Soviet  
space and Europe

### Reversal of trend in the Western CIS countries


In the post-Soviet space, particularly in the Western CIS countries, Russian influence is rising again after two decades of decline or stagnation. Russia is systematically using the enormous forward-looking investments it has made in the energy sector to penetrate the region economically and thereby to regain lost influence. New gas pipelines have been laid for supplying European customers directly, bypassing the previous transit countries of Ukraine and Belarus. The resulting increased structural dependencies will make it difficult in the long term for both countries to consolidate and develop the independence from Russia they obtained in 1991.

Toward the end of this decade, it is likely that Ukraine and Belarus will be under greater Russian influence economically and probably also politically, retaining formal sovereignty, but having political systems affiliated to Moscow and economies which are heavily subsidised by Russia. Russia under Putin has thus succeeded in halting the eastward expansion of the EU and

NATO and in changing the trend in the Western CIS countries to its own ends.

### Russia and Switzerland

Switzerland maintains diverse and intensive links with Russia, both at the national and at the individual level. Major sporting events like the Winter Olympic Games in Sochi (2014) and the FIFA World Cup (2018) will enhance Russia's appeal. On the whole, a reinvigorated Russia, consolidated again internally and seeking to regain lost influence externally, offers both opportunities and risks. A prosperous, outward-looking Russia offers diverse opportunities for bilateral and multilateral political and economic cooperation. The risks to Switzerland may take a variety of forms from the point of view of security, in the broad sense. Firstly, due to strengthening Russian influence in the Western CIS countries, periodic tensions must be expected between Russia on the one hand and the EU, the US and NATO on the other. Secondly, there are dependencies in areas such as energy supply. New challenges will emerge




with regard to oligarchically-structured sectors of the economy, corruption, criminality, illegal migration, influential intelligence services and economic espionage.

The fact that the open Swiss economy is closely interlinked with the European economy, and through this channel indirectly also with the Russian economy, will be a particular source of risk. For example, most of Switzerland's oil and gas imports come via Germany, which in turn is the largest buyer of Russian oil and gas exports. An estimated twenty to thirty per cent of the mineral oil and natural gas consumed in Switzerland originates from Russia. As far as mineral oil is concerned, Russia now accounts for approximately a third of the EU's imports. While a halt in Russian supplies could be offset in the short term through the international oil market, it would be difficult or perhaps even impossible to compensate for in the long term. As regards natural gas, the chemical industry, one of the most important branches of Switzerland's economy, is particularly dependent on uninterrupted gas imports. If Russia were to suspend deliveries to Europe for several months, this would therefore also impact on the Swiss economy.


Geneva is one of the most important commodity trading centres in the world. This brings with it opportunities and risks, which policy-makers and administrators have been monitoring with increased vigilance for some time. As a leading commodity exporter, Russia has a correspondingly strong presence in Switzerland as a trading centre. The majority of Russia's oil exports are now traded via Switzerland. ■





# Jihad-motivated violent extremism and terrorism

In the fight against jihadist terrorism, pressure on core al-Qaeda and its affiliates remains high. Increased numbers of attacks are being carried out by small groups and individual perpetrators, who have grown up in Western countries or have at least lived there, and who have been influenced by al-Qaeda propaganda. Particularly in conflict zones in Islamic regions, Swiss citizens could at any time be the target of kidnapping or other jihad-motivated acts of violence or terror.





## SITUATION

### Entry ban on jihadists from Switzerland

The trend in jihad-motivated travel movements out of Europe toward jihadist conflict zones has become more defined. The FIS is aware of several persons formerly resident in Switzerland who have travelled to a jihad area in Somalia or in Afghanistan/Pakistan in order to take part in combat operations. Some of them are still there. The first entry ban imposed in this context was declared in summer 2012 on a Jordanian-born man previously resident in Switzerland who, according to reliable intelligence, was in close contact with the Somali-based terrorist group al-Shabaab, part of the al-Qaeda network, and wanted to return to Switzerland following his stay in Somalia.

Following his return from Somalia, the Jordanian was arrested in Kenya for staying in the country illegally and on suspicion of supporting al-Shabaab. The Federal Office for Migration is considering revoking asylum in this case; at the time of going to press, the proceedings were still pending.

### Kidnappings in Pakistan, Mali, Yemen and the Philippines

Since March 2012, a Swiss couple who were kidnapped while travelling on holiday in the

province of Baluchistan (Pakistan) at the beginning of July 2011 have been enjoying freedom again. They managed to escape the clutches of their Islamist hostage-takers themselves. However, shortly before that, in February 2012, another Swiss citizen was kidnapped in the Sulu archipelago in the Philippines, also an area which the travel advice of the Federal Department of Foreign Affairs (FDFA) warns against visiting. At the time this report went to press, he was still being held captive. A Swiss woman was also held by an Islamist group in Yemen from mid-March 2012 until the end of February 2013. In mid-April 2012, a Swiss woman was kidnapped by Islamist forces in Timbuktu (Mali) but was released after a few days.

### Jihadist with Swiss links killed

The US, as well as local security forces in the Afghan/Pakistani border area, in Yemen and in Somalia, have continued their relentless pursuit of core al-Qaeda and its affiliates. Drone campaigns in these countries periodically result in the death of leading members of al-Qaeda. Rumours of the death of al-Shahri, second-in-command of al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP), which have been circulating in the media since September 2012, have not yet been



Moez Garsallaoui  
[photo taken in 2008]

substantiated. According to press reports, however, Adil al-Abab, a senior leading member of AQAP, was killed in a US drone strike at the beginning of October 2012.


Of particular note from the Swiss perspective was the death of the jihadist Moez Garsallaoui. He was killed in October 2012 in a drone strike in the Afghan/Pakistani border area. Garsallaoui was originally from Tunisia. He and his Moroccan/Belgian wife, Malika el Aroud, had been operating a jihadist website in Switzerland since 2004. In 2007 they were pronounced guilty at first instance by the Federal Criminal Court of, among other things, supporting a criminal organisation, as defined under Art. 260<sup>ter</sup> of the Swiss Criminal Code (SCC). However, Garsallaoui evaded the custodial sentence confirmed by the Federal Supreme Court the following year, and at the end of 2007 went to the Afghan/Pakistani border area as the leader of a group of European jihadists in order to fight against Western troops in Afghanistan. An entry ban valid to 2023 was then placed on him. In May 2010, a court in Brussels sentenced him in absentia and his wife to eight years' imprisonment each for leadership and membership respectively of a terrorist cell. Malika el Aroud is currently serving her sentence in Belgium. Garsallaoui is alleged to have

kept up close links to high-ranking members of jihadist groups in the Afghan/Pakistani border area, including core al-Qaeda.

### Increasing jihadist influence in Syria, Mali and Sinai

A de facto battle zone and a safe haven for jihadist forces where they can move freely has arisen in Syria, where the jihadist al-Nusra Front has an interest in destabilising the situation further. If the activities of the jihadist groups continue to increase, conditions there could become like those in Iraq in 2007, when suicide bombings were an everyday occurrence. The situation is similar in Mali, where in April 2012 local Tuareg groups and al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM) forces drove government troops out of the northern part of the country, and where the French intervention at the beginning of 2013 has not yet succeeded in resolving the situation.

The situation in the Egyptian Sinai peninsula also needs monitoring. In this partly demilitarised zone, which is under international observation, Bedouin groups have been carrying out increasing numbers of attacks and have, in several instances, held tourists against their will for short periods of time. It can be assumed that neither Egypt nor Israel has any interest in a de-



velopment that would turn Sinai into a safe haven for jihadist terrorists. However, this region will continue to attract considerable interest from jihadists due to its key geographical location between North Africa and the Middle East, and in particular its proximity to the Palestinian autonomous territories.

#### **Attack on US aircraft with sophisticated explosive charge averted**

At the end of April 2012, the US intelligence services seized a sophisticated explosive device. It is alleged to have come from AQAP and that it was meant to be carried on board an aircraft heading for the US by one of its members. Experts estimate that the explosive charge was powerful enough to have caused serious damage to the aircraft.

AQAP has been a threat to international aviation for some time: the first attack attempted by AQAP on Western interests outside Yemen took place over the Christmas period in 2009, when a Nigerian on a Northwest Airlines flight from Amsterdam to Detroit tried to detonate an explosive charge. At the end of October 2010, two parcel bombs with return addresses in Yemen were seized at East Midlands Airport (United Kingdom) and in Dubai (United Arab Emirates) on cargo planes heading for the USA.

#### **Jihadist-inspired multiple murder in Toulouse (France)**

In March 2012, a radicalised Jihadist, acting alone, shot seven people in the space of ten days (three French soldiers, a religious education teacher and three pupils from a Jewish

school) in Greater Toulouse. The assassin, a dual Algerian-French citizen born in Toulouse in 1988, was killed during the subsequent police intervention.

According to information from the French authorities, the perpetrator was known to the police and intelligence services, had already served prison sentences for offences including armed robbery, was on the files as a jihadist travelling to Afghanistan and Pakistan and was involved, with his equally radicalised brother, in Salafist circles in Toulouse. Both are reported to have belonged to the French Salafist group Forsane Alizza (Knights of Pride), which was banned in March 2012. According to media reports in Nice, thirty members of the group (which presents itself on its website as radical) who had been recruited for jihad were arrested in December 2011; the arrests took place just before they set out for Afghanistan.

#### **Violent Salafist scene in Germany**

In mid-June 2012, the German authorities conducted major raids on Salafists and their networks and initiated investigation proceedings. The Solingen-based Millatu Ibrahim group was banned, as it had been inciting Muslims in Germany to join the active struggle against the constitutional order. There had previously been violent confrontations between adherents of the far-right Pro NRW party and violent Salafists in Germany. Salafists had also issued death threats against journalists. The FIS is not aware of any lasting links between German Salafist circles and Switzerland; however, Salafist propaganda from Germany does also find its way to its tar-

get public in Switzerland via the internet and chat forums. Meanwhile, in compliance with its legal obligations, the FIS is monitoring only Salafists who have been identified as having clear links to violence, i.e. jihadists. A vital tool in their identification is jihadism monitoring on the internet, which the FIS carries out in close cooperation with the Federal Office of Police (fedpol).

### Unrest and deaths following defamation of the prophet Mohammed

In early September 2012, a US-produced video which denigrated the prophet Mohammed set off a wave of protests and violence which was directed first and foremost against US diplomatic missions, primarily in the Islamic world. The author of the video is said to be an Egyptian Christian with a criminal past, living in the US. It is thought that extreme Christian fundamentalists in the US helped him distribute the video. On the highly symbolic date of 11 September 2012, there were violent protests against the US embassies in Cairo and Tunis.

The American embassy in Yemen was also attacked; in clashes with security forces, four attackers were killed. In numerous cities in the Islamic world (including Gaza City, Kabul, Karachi and Jakarta), and also in Manila and Sydney, there were anti-American protests, which in some cases resulted in fatalities. Around 500 students protested against the US in front of the Swiss embassy in Tehran, supervised by a large contingent of police. In Sudan, a preacher linked the video to the minaret ban in Switzerland as well as to the Mohammed cartoons, which had been on display again in Berlin shortly before. The German embassy in Khartoum was then attacked. In Lebanon, the leader of Hezbollah called for a week of protest. Following the publication of a Mohammed caricature by the French satire magazine Charlie Hebdo, France closed over twenty embassies, consulates and schools worldwide for fear of riots. The reasons behind the attack on the US consulate in Benghazi (Libya), in which four people were killed, including the US ambassador, remained unclear at the time of going to press.



Jihadism on the internet: screenshot taken in 2012

Political leaders in the region attempted to smooth things over, but mostly without taking a clear stance against the violent demonstrators. On 22 September 2012, Muslims living in Switzerland organised a peaceful rally in Bern under the slogan 'For our prophet Mohammed and the protection of religious sentiments'.

## ASSESSMENT

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### Two opposing trends

The situation with regard to jihadist terrorism is characterised by two trends. Firstly, pressure on core al-Qaeda and its affiliates remains high, particularly through drone campaigns by the US and its allies. This has tended to reduce the risk of major centrally-controlled terrorist attacks by al-Qaeda itself. Secondly, however, increased numbers of attacks are carried out by small groups and individual perpetrators, who have grown up in Western countries or have at least lived there and whose actions have been inspired by al-Qaeda propaganda.

### **AQAP: under considerable pressure in Yemen**

The leading members of AQAP find themselves under considerable pressure on the one hand from the Yemeni security authorities, who use air attacks and ground offensives against AQAP, and on the other hand from US drone strikes. The sharp increase in the number of drone strikes suggests that pressure on AQAP will remain high.

### **AQAP internet magazine a source of inspiration for individual perpetrators**

The killing of the AQAP activists Anwar al-Awlaki and Samir Khan at the end of September 2011 succeeded in delaying the publication of al-Qaeda's English-language online propaganda magazine 'Inspire', but not in stopping it altogether. Although the quality of the language

and the layout has declined, 'Inspire' continues to function as a recruiting tool, calling on potential jihadists worldwide to carry out attacks in their home countries. Even after his death, Al-Awlaki remains an inspirational figure for jihadists. Moreover, in jihadist internet forums in Arabic and in English, AQAP continues to call on individual perpetrators to carry out attacks.

### **Recruitment and training of foreign militants in Yemen**

In the context of jihadist travel movements from and to Europe, Yemen had until now seemed to be important principally in connection with visits to language and Koran schools rather than as a setting for jihad. However, there are indications that people from the West are travelling to Yemen, or attempting to do so, with the aim of making contact with AQAP. AQAP appears to be deliberately seeking to recruit and train citizens of Western countries in order to deploy them for attacks in their countries of origin. We are already aware of some cases in Europe involving returnees from Yemen, although not of any in Switzerland.

### **Radicalisation processes follow very different lines**

Radicalisation processes vary considerably in terms of their duration and the factors which trigger or speed up radicalisation. In addition to personal contacts, the internet also plays a

major role in radicalisation. However, as soon as someone actually makes up his/her mind to commit to jihad, personal contacts are particularly important for a successful journey and for acceptance into a jihadist group. Loose recruitment networks appear to exist, within which the recruiters exert influence on the jihad volunteers and their impending journeys. Besides these, there are also cases where no recruiter has previously been involved and radicalised jihad volunteers seek out direct contact with traffickers in order to gain access to jihad areas.

**Somalia main destination for jihadists from Switzerland**

From a Swiss perspective, Somalia is currently the most important jihad area, as the majority of the jihad travellers from Switzerland who have so far been identified were heading to Somalia. One reason for this could be that, in this case, individuals operating in the radicalisation and recruitment field are able to draw on existing support and trafficking structures. The choice of jihad area often depends on the

existence of networks of contacts and thus also has much to do with expediency. The fact that support and trafficking structures exist is likely to lead to their use by an increasing number of jihad volunteers.

It is therefore not surprising that the current case of a Swiss entry ban being imposed on a jihad traveller was connected to the Somali terrorist group al-Shabaab.

**Garsallaoui case highlights specific risks posed by jihad travellers**

Moez Garsallaoui, who was killed in autumn 2012, had transformed himself from a virtual jihadist in Switzerland into an operational jihadist in the Afghan/Pakistani border area and commanded a degree of respect in European jihadist circles. During his stay in the Afghan/Pakistani border area he also made references to Switzerland: for example, in 2008 he wrote a threatening letter which was published in jihadist internet forums. In it, he accused the Swiss government and security authorities of being part of the so-called Zionist crusade against Islam. However, the text met with little response.

It is difficult to gauge conclusively the extent to which he was actually involved in operational activities and what role he played in recruiting potential jihadists including those from Europe. It can be assumed, however, that Garsallaoui's death represents at the least a symbolic loss to jihadist circles in Europe.



Winter 2012 edition of al-Qaeda's propaganda magazine 'Inspire'



### **The Toulouse case: a jihadist individual perpetrator**

Jihadist-motivated individual perpetrators (homegrown terrorists) have already carried out attacks involving firearms on several occasions in Europe and in the US. Examples include attacks on the US embassy in Sarajevo (Bosnia and Herzegovina) in October 2011, on US military personnel at the airport in Frankfurt (Germany) in March 2011 and on the US military base at Fort Hood in Texas in November 2009.

The Toulouse assassin acted with extreme brutality. He is alleged to have stated that he was acting on behalf of al-Qaeda. No more precise details about his ideological and military training are known, and we have no detailed information about his activities or where he stayed in Afghanistan, Pakistan and possibly Tajikistan. However, it seems plausible that he spent some time in jihadist training camps.

No detail is yet known about the assassin's motives. While individual perpetrators generally claim ideological motivation (revenge for French intervention in Afghanistan or for the Israeli occupation of Palestine), it is very often the case that they attack people or groups whom they see as responsible for their hopeless situation. For example, the victims in the Toulouse case included three French soldiers, and the perpetrator is alleged to have been rejected for service in the French army.

### **Protests about defamatory film insulting believers**

The widespread protests in Muslim countries against the defamatory film produced in the US in September 2012 have been the first large-

scale anti-Western riots since the beginning of the Arab Spring. It is particularly noticeable that the most violent demonstrations took place in those countries where repressive regimes have been ousted. The nature of the clashes indicate that some of the new security authorities still have little experience dealing with protests in a way that defuses tension.

Switzerland was not a focus of the worldwide protests in September 2012 and was not mentioned by name, with the exception of a reference to the minaret ban by a Sudanese preacher. The demonstration in front of the Swiss embassy in Tehran was not directed at Switzerland, but at the US, whose interests are represented in Iran by Switzerland. However, in the eyes of Islamist extremists, Switzerland is perceived as part of the Western world, which is allegedly conducting a crusade against Islam.

The power of actual or perceived symbols of Islam, such as the Koran, the prophet Mohammed, minarets and veils, as a collective framework of reference and a mark of identification should not be underestimated. Many Muslims will again react sensitively to any further action which they see as an anti-Islamic provocation. It is also likely that the Islamists, who have gained strength since the upheavals in the Arab world in the past year, will increasingly attempt to exploit the accusation of insulting believers – not least in order to set themselves apart from and compete with the new, more Islamically-oriented regimes.



Within the mandate of its legal obligations, the FIS is monitoring the ongoing debate about Islamophobia. There is still the possibility that the mention of the minaret ban or other references to Islamophobia in Switzerland could contribute to the radicalisation of individuals. It is also possible that Islamist or jihadist groups could use Switzerland's allegedly hostile attitude towards Islam as an excuse to call for action. Violent campaigns against Switzerland or Swiss interests abroad thus remain possible in the current context.

## PROSPECTS

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### **Jihad travellers represent significant security risk**

Jihad travellers pose a substantial and growing security risk to Western countries. This assessment, shared by many intelligence services, has resulted in arrests of jihad volunteers in conflict regions and their extradition to their countries of origin, and in the intensive surveillance and if necessary the arrest of those returning to Europe. In some cases, criminal law provisions are being amended accordingly. If jihad supporters spend time in conflict zones, there is the danger that they may take part in fighting against Western troops or even be deployed in attacks on Western interests and the local civilian population. In this way, jihadists damage both the reputation and the interests of their previous countries of residence, which may then come under pressure from those countries which have suffered direct damage.

With returnees there is the risk that they will use their acquired skills to plan and carry out attacks in their country of residence or in other Western countries. In addition, they may act as a role model and a source of inspiration to others or actively recruit individuals. The fact that returnees pose a real danger is shown not just by the Toulouse case, but also by another recent case: at the end of April 2011, three people were arrested in Germany who were alleged to have planned attacks on targets in Germany. The leader of the so-called Düsseldorf cell is thought to have undergone training at a camp

in Pakistan and to have been in contact with a member of core al-Qaeda. In the trial which commenced in November 2012, he is charged with having systematically attempted to build a bomb.

### **Syria, Mali and Sinai: current and potential new destinations for jihad travellers**

The civil war in Syria, the secession movement in northern Mali and to a certain degree the security vacuum which has emerged in the Sinai peninsula have provided new destinations for jihad travellers where they can take part in armed conflict or attend training camps. The jihad groups and individuals which are increasingly active in Syria thus have a strong interest in keeping the violent conflict going. The general unrest in the country increases their scope for action and creates opportunities for terrorist actions. A similar situation exists in northern Mali, from where insecurity is spreading to the entire Sahel zone and also to north African countries. This is shown by the jihadist attack on a gas production plant in Algeria at the end of January 2013, during which several Western hostages were killed.

### **Attacks by individual perpetrators difficult to prevent**

The Toulouse attacks show once again how hard it is to prevent the actions of an individual in advance, even where the person concerned is already known to the police or intelligence ser-

vices. The threat from terrorist attacks by individual perpetrators cannot be precisely assessed, nor can such attacks be prevented in all cases. Switzerland, as a country with small military commitments abroad, is not a declared priority target for jihad-motivated attacks. Nonetheless, attacks which are either deliberately targeted at Switzerland or Swiss interests or which affect them by chance, particularly by radicalized individual perpetrators, cannot be ruled out. In intelligence monitoring of jihadist websites, particular attention is therefore paid to calls for copycat attacks.

### **High risk to Swiss in conflict zones**

In recent years, the number of politically-motivated kidnappings of Swiss abroad has risen dramatically. While in previous years only isolated politically-motivated kidnappings were recorded, and a kidnapping in the Sahara in 2003 was the first major case of this kind to involve the relevant authorities, between 2009 and 2012 the FDFA, the FIS and fedpol dealt with ten kidnappings with a political or terrorist background. Almost all these cases had a jihadist background, and all of them took place in countries for which the FDFA issues travel advice warning against visiting either the whole country or specific regions. In the current international situation, Swiss citizens could thus at any time be the target of kidnapping or other jihad acts of violence or terror, particularly in conflict zones in Islamic regions.

## FDFA travel advice

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The FDFA's travel advice covers around 170 countries, is consulted on the FDFA website around two million times a year and since August 2011 has also been available on Twitter.

The travel advice provides a broadly-based assessment of the security situation, with an emphasis on politics and crime.


- As travellers are sometimes faced with so much often contradictory information that it is hard for them to sort it out, the travel advice helps them to choose their holiday destination.
  - Because the FDFA has good connections through its embassies and consulates abroad and also incorporates information from other federal agencies, for example from the intelligence service, it is able to make a balanced assessment of the situation for its travel advice.
  - Because the FDFA has no financial interests, it is considered by the travel industry and the public to be independent and trustworthy.
- The travel advice recommends precautionary measures in order to reduce the risks,
- because the Federal Council has given the FDFA the task of drawing people's attention to the potential risks involved in foreign travel
  - because it doesn't want people's dream holidays to turn into nightmares
  - and because you can only minimise the risks if you know what they are.
- In extreme cases, the FDFA advises against travel to a particular region or country,
- because the FDFA assesses travel to that area as being too risky due to the particular threat level
  - and because the FDFA often has only restricted or even no access to crisis areas and can therefore provide Swiss citizens there with only limited or no support. ■

### Internet sites:


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
# International terrorism and Switzerland

Switzerland has not been affected by international terrorism to the same extent as its neighbouring countries; nonetheless, Switzerland, its citizens and its interests abroad have on repeated occasions fallen victim to such acts. The table below shows the most prominent cases since the 1960s – including politically-motivated kidnappings, but excluding politically-motivated acts of violence by Swiss perpetrators.




- 1 Kidnapping, number of Swiss hostages
- Politically-motivated murder of a foreigner in Switzerland, probably by a state or a terrorist group





# Ethno-nationalist motivated violent extremism and terrorism

As regards ethno-nationalist violent extremist and terrorist movements, the Kurdistan Workers' Party (PKK) is of particular concern to Switzerland. There have been numerous and repeated protests in support of the PKK across Europe. In Switzerland, too, such events take place on a regular basis, with the PKK making every effort not to be perceived as a violent group. The state of Öcalan's health will be key in determining how the situation unfolds in relation to the PKK. There is currently little sign of activity by the successor organisations of the Tamil Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE) in Europe or in Switzerland; however, the problem of minorities in Sri Lanka remains unresolved.





## SITUATION

### PKK: serious clashes in the Kurdish region

As far as ethno-nationalist violent extremist and terrorist groups are concerned, the Kurdistan Workers' Party (PKK) is of particular concern to Switzerland. The situation in the south-east of Turkey remained tense in 2012. In the border area with northern Iraq, further skirmishes took place between the Turkish armed forces and PKK rebels, with heavy losses on both sides. Compared with the previous year, these clashes were more numerous and more severe.

In tandem with its military actions against the PKK, the ruling Turkish AKP party is attempting to win over the Kurdish population with a planned constitutional reform and has already taken steps towards liberalisation. Talks also took place between the Turkish intelligence service and the detained PKK leader Abdullah Öcalan.

### PKK: sporadic rioting at demonstrations in Europe and triple murder in Paris

Once again, numerous protests have taken place across Europe in support of Öcalan's release, for example a Kurdish march from Geneva to Strasbourg (France) and large-scale demonstrations in a number of European cities. There were also protests about legal measures taken against the PKK in Europe, such as the fine imposed on the Kurdish broadcaster Roj TV in Denmark.

During these demonstrations, isolated incidences of violent altercations between Turkish and Kurdish youths were recorded across Europe. In Germany, Kurdish protest campaigns in September 2012 were accompanied on two occasions by violent rioting. During a Kurdish cultural festival in Mannheim attended by around 40 000 participants, a fight broke out over the carrying of the PKK flag, which is banned in Germany, leading to rioting against the police by several hundred Kurds. Among



the law enforcement agencies alone, 80 people were injured, and 13 emergency vehicles were damaged.

In Switzerland, too, a series of events were held by PKK supporters, for example in front of the UN headquarters in Geneva and in various other cities, notably Zurich, Basel and Bern. In some cases, media companies' premises were also occupied temporarily. These occasions generally passed off peacefully, even though not all of them had been approved by the authorities in advance.

On 9 January 2013, three PKK activists were murdered in Paris, including a co-founder of the organisation; at the time of going to press the perpetrator was unknown.

#### **LTTE:**

##### **little activity by successor organisations**

Following the defeat of the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE) by the Sri Lankan army and the death of their leader Velupillai Prabhakaran in May 2009, the LTTE in Sri Lanka is seen as having been crushed. The continuing strict security precautions in the north and east of Sri Lanka are preventing the emergence of successor organisations or of any organised resistance.

To date there has been no evidence of any clear successor bodies in the diaspora community. It is currently possible to identify several camps which want to continue the political struggle for a separate Tamil state in Sri Lanka; all the organisations that are known distance themselves from violent conflict, at least officially. These are particularly active in countries with large Tamil diaspora communities, such as Switzerland. At the time of going to press, the reasons behind the murder of the former LTTE leader in France in November 2012 were still largely unclear.

National affiliates of the LTTE continue to exist in some countries. The Swiss affiliate organises propaganda events for the Tamil exile community in Switzerland, at which LTTE insignia are often used. Money is also donated at these events, but it is not clear what this money is used for.

Kurdish demonstrators at a rally of a 'national alliance against repression' on 29 September 2012 in Basel



## ASSESSMENT

### Broad trend primarily dependent on situation in country of origin

Developments regarding foreign ethno-nationalist violent extremist and terrorist groups in Switzerland primarily depend on the situation in the respective country of origin and the size and degree of organisation of the diaspora community concerned. The exile communities form a potential recruitment reservoir for violent extremist groups. Sections of the communities may support such groups voluntarily or come under huge pressure to do so. Escalation to terrorist or violent campaigns in the country of origin will not, however, necessarily lead directly to an increase in activities in the diaspora. However, the well-developed networks and not least the youth organisations of such groups enable them to recommence violent extremist or even terrorist activities at short notice and with little or no warning, even after a long period of quiescence.

### PKK does not wish to be perceived in Western Europe as a violent group

With the exception of Germany and a number of confrontations in France, the situation with regard to the PKK in Western Europe and in particular in Switzerland has remained quiet in recent months. Although fierce fighting has been taking place and attacks have been carried out in the Kurdish regions, so far the behaviour of the PKK in the European diaspora communities has not changed. The PKK has demanded the release of Öcalan on the usual commemorative days and has accused the Turkish government of repression, without referring to the latest events in the Kurdish regions. The PKK leadership seems to set store by not being perceived in Western Europe as a violent group, while at the same time within the Kurdish community it uses the attacks for propaganda, to motivate its adherents and to strengthen support.



Paint attack on a Turkish travel agency in Bern, 10 November 2012

**LTTE:****minorities problem remains unresolved**

The Sri Lankan government missed the opportunity to initiate a reconciliation process between Tamils and Singhalese when the fighting ended in 2009. However, a renewed flare-up of fighting is very unlikely in the next three to five years, due to the rigid security precautions, the war-weariness of the Tamil population in the east and north of the country and the lack of a successor to Prabhakaran.

Nonetheless, the desire for a state of their own is still widespread in the Tamil diaspora community. However, there is disagreement about whether the struggle should be fought on a political plane or by other means. The murder of the former LTTE leader in France could possibly be an indication of rivalry over the issue of succession. At the moment there are no specific signs that a violent Tamil separatist movement is being resurrected. If Sri Lanka does not succeed in establishing a basis for trust between Singhalese and Tamils, or if the Tamil minority is subjected to increased repression by the government, this could contribute to the renewed emergence of an armed Tamil movement.

## PROSPECTS

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### **Öcalan's state of health key to further developments relating to the PKK**


The Kurdish diaspora community in Europe continues to play a key role for the PKK in the areas of propaganda, fundraising, recruitment and training. In principle, the PKK is still in a position to mobilise its supporters in the Kurdish diaspora community rapidly and in large numbers, depending on how the conflict in Turkey evolves. Its preferred tool for this purpose is Kurdish youth. It is therefore likely that, as happened in Germany in 2012, any violent campaigns here in Switzerland would predominantly be carried out by groups of young Kurds. As long as the conflict in their home country does not escalate further and there are no extraordinary coercive measures by the Turkish or European authorities, it is not anticipated that there will be large-scale use of violence, either at rallies or in spontaneous actions.

However, deterioration of the situation in the short term, the impression that numbers of PKK victims in the Kurdish regions are rising, long periods with no information on Öcalan's health or a wave of repression in Turkey or in Europe could at any time lead once more to an increased willingness on the part of the Kurdish diaspora community in Europe and in Switzerland to use violence. Öcalan is about to turn 65; if the PKK leader's health deteriorates seriously or he dies in captivity, it remains likely that there would be violent protest campaigns and attacks throughout Europe.

### **LTTE: no evidence of former cadres or combatants in Switzerland**


Switzerland, with its large Tamil diaspora community of around 50 000, is affected by developments in Sri Lanka. In the past, the Tamil diaspora community in Switzerland was seen as providing important support for the LTTE. Propaganda events and fundraising for the LTTE and its successor organisations are still taking place on a smaller scale. A worsening of the situation in Sri Lanka could lead to an intensification of Tamil activity in Switzerland. However, at the moment there is no verified evidence that there are any high-up former LTTE cadres or combatants living in Switzerland and attempting from here to exert influence on the Tamil diaspora community inside or outside Switzerland. ■





# Right- and left-wing extremism and animal rights extremism

Violent extremism in Switzerland is not on a scale that poses a danger to the state. In this country, there have been scarcely any acts of violence attributable to right-wing extremism for some time now. The situation as regards left-wing extremism has also calmed down somewhat over the last twelve months. The continuing trend in right-wing extremism is the consequence of a withdrawal from the public eye: however, there is still a certain sense of unease among the security authorities about possible clandestine activities. The slight easing of the situation with regard to violent left-wing extremism, on the other hand, might be the result of tactical restraint and the preventive effects of criminal law.





## SITUATION

### Incidents: slight easing of the situation

In 2012, the FIS was aware of 46 incidents connected with violent right-wing extremism, and 229 incidents connected with violent left-wing extremism; mere graffiti was not included in the figures. The number of recorded incidents fell by six per cent for right-wing extremism and by ten per cent for left-wing extremism. However, more telling than these annual fluctuations, where the low figures involved lead to considerable percentage swings, is a comparison over several years: the volume of activities in both circles remains stable – at a relatively high level in the case of left-wing extremism, and a relatively low one for right-wing extremism.

The situation as regards violent extremism has eased slightly. However, the figures need to be qualified and explained. Around 45 per cent of the incidents recorded in connection with left-wing extremism involved violence, while the proportion for right-wing extremism was at least 54 per cent, although the term ‘violence’ covers a multitude of actions.

Violence on the part of left-wing extremists manifests itself in attacks involving the use of stones, bottles or fireworks and very occasionally chemicals such as butyric acid, directed

not only at property but also at people. These include attacks on the police and other security forces, but also assaults on passers-by during left-wing extremist campaigns. Violence is also perpetrated against property, for example in the form of arson or paint attacks – currently buildings are the main target of such attacks, with vehicles being targeted only sporadically. Left-wing extremists also continue to deploy commercially available pyrotechnics, even against people. However, their trademark bomb attacks using modified fireworks remain rare; there were just two improvised explosive or incendiary device (IED/IID) attacks, which took place in the night of 23/24 January 2013 in the canton of Zurich in connection with the World Economic Forum (WEF) 2013. The Revolutionäre Jugend Zürich (RJZ) claimed responsibility on the internet for these attacks.

Right-wing extremists also make use of fire and paint; they carried out paint attacks on property, but on several occasions physical injuries to people were also recorded, in one case as the result of a stabbing. Two attempted murders by right-wing extremists are still the subject of criminal investigations, but it is thought that the motive was criminal or personal rather than based on ideological right-wing extremism.



There were isolated clashes between right-wing extremists and left-wing extremists: for example, in June 2012 in Geneva, a left-wing extremist was attacked by a right-wing extremist and suffered serious stab wounds, while in May in Basel left-wing extremists spontaneously mobilised against a group of right-wing extremists, took away the flags they were carrying and burnt them in front of the railway station. Violence between violent extremists of varying hues has, however, become a rare occurrence in Switzerland, as right-wing extremists are now avoiding provocative public scenes. In addition, where the security forces are aware of activities by one side, they deploy to prevent a clash with adherents of the opposing side.

### Right-wing extremism

Violent actions by right-wing extremists still tend to be in response to a particular situation rather than following any kind of strategy. They are based at least in part on personal and not ideological, right-wing extremist motives, even where it is established beyond doubt that the perpetrator is part of the movement.

However, isolated attacks on institutions connected with the asylum system have been recorded. In January 2012 three right-wing extremists broke into the refugee centre in Brittnau (Aargau), sprayed those present with cleaning agents and threatened them. In April and May 2012, two arson attacks were carried out within the space of a week on the transit centre in Affoltern am Albis (Zurich). The perpetrators are unknown, and there is no definite link to right-wing extremism. However, such a

link is highly probable in the case of a paint attack on the refugee centre in Hütten (Zurich) in July 2012, where unknown perpetrators sprayed the centre with a swastika, a Celtic cross and the abbreviation 'WP' for 'White Power'.

There were several cases involving physical injuries which had a xenophobic or ideological background. Some right-wing extremists are armed and occasionally use the weapons they carry. Firearms are collected, traded and possibly also smuggled over the border. Right-wing extremists' fondness for weapons persists; those found in house searches – generally chance discoveries – suggest that there are substantial collections of functioning weapons in the hands of right-wing extremists.

As the movement keeps a low profile, larger events such as skinhead concerts very seldom take place in this country. Swiss right-wing extremists go to skinhead events abroad; the nearer the venue where the event is taking place, the more Swiss people will be found there. However, one event stands out from the rest: for the first time, several far-right groups jointly called for people to attend their 1st August celebrations, traditionally held on the weekend following the national holiday. On 5 August, 200 right-wing extremists attended this celebration on the Rütli meadow. Right-wing extremists can currently be prevented from attending of-



Paint attack on an asylum centre in the canton of Zürich, 7 July 2012

ficial celebrations of historic commemorative days, or they stay away from such festivities of their own volition.

### Left-wing extremism

Left-wing extremist groups seek publicity for their issues. Despite their determined dissociation from established media and political institutions, they therefore react to current events. Federal elections, together with referendum campaigns on relevant issues and the results of such referenda, are events that affect the public profile of violent left-wing extremist groups. Left-wing extremists continue to make the most of any opportunity to demonstrate against their enemy, the Swiss People's Party, or against Swiss policy on asylum. Nevertheless, violent left-wing extremist circles cannot themselves put issues on the public agenda, even if they try.

The WEF in Davos and Labour Day are currently the two most important annual events which can provide a platform for left-wing extremists. However, their significance is limited, as the protests against the WEF no longer mobilise opponents of globalisation who are not prepared to use violence, and the security forces are able to nip riots in the bud, even on 1 May. The security precautions at each event remain

necessary, as they are one of the main reasons the events are able to pass off peacefully. Left-wing extremist circles are thus largely preoccupied with their own issues and keep themselves to themselves. Besides fruitless attempts to engage in industrial disputes, two main sets of issues can be identified: firstly, 'solidarity with prisoners' and its counterpart 'repression' and secondly the 'capitalist economic order', which in their eyes represents the world order.

In the fight against the 'capitalist economic order', companies, first and foremost banks and insurance companies, have repeatedly been the targets of attacks or acts of sabotage. While such attacks sometimes inflict extensive damage, left-wing extremist groups have recently had some success with protests against individual events at universities, that is to say they have succeeded in preventing lectures from taking place. Although they have failed to prevent representatives of international institutions, such as the Managing Director of the IMF or the NATO Secretary-General, from giving their speeches, they have prevailed against private individuals: events featuring the CEO of Nestlé and a former German foreign minister were cancelled.



Remnants of the IED used in the attack on a branch of the Credit Suisse bank in Zürich-Hottingen, 24 January 2013

Under the slogan ‘Struggle against repression’, police and security forces were attacked directly or indirectly (for example in attacks on police stations). The Bern Riding School, in particular, is frequently a rallying point for such attacks and a place to which perpetrators retreat. The counterpart to this struggle against repression is ‘Solidarity with prisoners’, which besides attacks also manifests itself in so-called ‘prison walks’, where fireworks are regularly deployed. In recent months, left-wing extremists have been arrested in a variety of different contexts, which has triggered large-scale solidarity campaigns within the respective local groups and sometimes also between them. Individuals detained in Switzerland whose influence extends to international left-wing extremist circles will be discussed further below. Solidarity with prisoners also includes following court cases. The movement maintains a presence, but the activists keep a low profile, in order not to do the accused a disservice. All in all, the tactic of keeping a low profile may have been an important element of the situation at the time when the verdict against two Revolutionärer Aufbau Zürich (RAZ) activists was awaiting examination by the Federal Supreme Court. In September 2012, the Federal Supreme Court confirmed both verdicts.

Finally, mention should be made of ‘Reclaim the Streets’ events and similar occasions where ‘free spaces’ in some form or other are demanded or temporarily ‘created’. Such events are very seldom organised by left-wing extremist circles, but are sometimes used as a screen and can be exploited as a tool for violent left-wing extremist actions.

### Left-wing extremism’s international links

In contrast with right-wing extremists, whose cross-border contact has so far been limited to personal contacts, some violent left-wing extremists (together with a number of animal rights extremists who are also prepared to use violence) collaborate with related groups abroad. Particularly worthy of mention here is RAZ, which runs one of the central secretariats of International Red Aid (SRI) and can be seen as one of its driving forces. SRI has for a long time been working to organise solidarity campaigns for left-wing extremists abroad and following their court cases; in recent years it has been engaged primarily in favour of activists from Italy and Greece.

It is thought that there also exist personal links with Federazione Anarchica Informale [Informal Anarchist Federation] (FAI) in northern Italy. On 7 May 2012 in Genoa, this group carried out an attack on the chairman of an Italian firm, and in the letter claiming responsibility proclaimed its solidarity with four detainees in Switzerland. The three people convicted in the court of first instance of a bomb attack



Poster calling for solidarity with prisoners – September 2012 in Basel

planned in 2010 on IBM's research centre in Rüschlikon (Zurich canton) were released from custody in summer and autumn 2012; however, in two of the three cases the Federal Supreme Court upheld an appeal and sent the cases back to the Federal Criminal Court in November 2012. The fourth detainee, the violent environmental activist and anarchist Marco Camenisch, is serving a prison sentence for murder until 2018. In June 2012, eight people were arrested in Italy in connection with FAI attacks; at the same time and in connection with the same attacks, an arrest warrant was issued against Camenisch.

Swiss left-wing extremists and animal rights extremists are currently collaborating with left-wing extremists in northern Italy, particularly anarchist environmental activists. It is chiefly the left-wing extremists who are supporting the fight, being waged under the slogan 'No TAV', against the construction of the high-speed rail link between Turin (Italy) and Lyon (France), which will pass through the Susa valley. Related protests and damage to property have also been recorded in Switzerland. Swiss left-wing extremists are also campaigning against the 'Notre-Dame-des-Landes' airport project in France.

### **Animal rights extremism**

The number of people able and willing to conduct a violent animal rights campaign in Switzerland is small. This sometimes leads to lengthy periods with no notable events. In the last twelve months, incidents have included the spray-painting claimed by the Animal Libera-

tion Front (ALF) at the beginning of August in Tessin and two paint attacks on a fur shop in Bern during the same month. The overwhelming majority of campaigns in Switzerland are currently conducted without violence and by legal means.

## ASSESSMENT

### Right-wing extremism

Over the past decade, violent right-wing extremist circles have had to learn that their ideology finds little resonance in Switzerland and that even moderating it and participating in the political system does not make it socially acceptable. Their efforts at political participation have so far failed, and thus one of the reasons for the low profile they have been maintaining in terms of public provocation and the use of violence has partially ceased to apply. This brake is now missing, but the personal consequences will probably also have become clear to activists – those recognised as right-wing extremists must, for example, fear for their professional advancement.

The movement is turned on in itself; this is shown clearly by the clandestine behaviour which has been noted for years and which is now almost universally to be seen. The opportunities to network inconspicuously via social media are likely to provide a further platform for this trend. Isolated incidences of violence, which remain a possibility, if currently not very likely, do not contradict this finding; in such cases, it is frequently alcohol that lowers inhibitions. Clandestine activities remain a cause for concern among the security authorities.

#### Proceedings against right-wing extremists in Germany

Following the discovery of the three-person Zwickau cell, which is now known by its chosen name, the National Socialist Underground (NSU), Germany has intensified its efforts in the fight against right-wing extremism. This has led, among other things, to the initiation of a number of criminal proceedings, which are not directly linked to those against the NSU. In these cases the German authorities have, through the firearms used in the attacks, also found evidence leading over the border to Switzerland. All information that has come to light and been verified so far confirms the picture that the FIS already had of the Swiss far right: personal contacts with Germany exist, but the number and nature of these still do not justify their being described as institutionalised links. There are also no indications that right-wing extremists from Switzerland have taken a direct part in serious criminal acts. However, the FIS has ascertained that right-wing extremists from Germany have taken up residence in Switzerland in recent years. This relocation is probably chiefly due to personal and especially economic reasons; in any case there have so far been no indications that far-right structures have been shifted from Germany to Switzerland, or that German right-wing extremists who have moved here play a significant part in the Swiss movement or are planning criminal acts in Switzerland.



### Left-wing extremism

With the release of the three people convicted of the planned attack on the IBM research centre (the two Italian citizens are banned from entering Switzerland in the next five years, but as mentioned their appeal hearing was still pending at the time this report went to press), one important motive for attacks by the FAI in Switzerland or on Swiss interests, which last occurred in March 2011, will probably no longer apply. However, the case of Marco Camenisch continues to provide a motive, and the FAI will thus probably continue to carry out attacks, including abroad, though there are also potential targets in Switzerland. Individual FAI cells will, however, probably have been weakened by the successes of the Italian security authorities; for example, there were no FAI-style attacks around Christmas time in 2012. The organisation Revolutionärer Aufbau Schweiz (RAS) and its Zurich section still set the pace for the majority of left-wing extremist circles, but they will be unable to influence at will members' readiness to use violence or to motivate individuals to

commit serious acts of violence. However, the potential for violence, as is shown by the IED/IID attacks in January 2013, is still assessed as being high overall, and in any case, left-wing extremists originating from outside the country could use large-scale attacks to remind people of this potential.

It is unlikely in the short term that the violent far left scene will change its priorities, and, despite the economic crisis, it will probably fail to find any widespread social movement which it can use as a platform and exploit for its own purposes. Nonetheless, the events mentioned earlier in connection with the 'free spaces' campaign do provide the violent far left with recruitment opportunities.

### Animal rights extremism

There is a limited potential for violence in the animal rights extremist scene in Switzerland, but this is not being drawn on in its own current campaigns. The only time a strategy that was violent to any considerable extent has been actively supported in Switzerland in recent years was in connection with the UK Stop Huntingdon Animal Cruelty (SHAC) campaign. A campaign against the global US animal research company Harlan has also attracted interest in this country; however there are currently no signs indicating that the campaign might turn violent.

Animal rights extremists in Switzerland who are prepared to use violence are still linked to the violent far left scene and maintain contact with activists abroad who are prepared to use violence. The Swiss scene forms a point of in-



Call for animal rights extremists to attend May Day meeting in Zürich in 2012

tersection between the differing scenes in the UK and the Netherlands on the one hand and in Italy, in particular, on the other. In Switzerland, the small circles of people prepared to use violence are centred in Tessin, in western Switzerland and in Zurich, and focus on contacts with activists in Italy who are prepared to use violence.



## PROSPECTS

### Potential for violence

The potential for violence of all three violent extremist scenes in Switzerland can generally be classified as being lower than it is in other countries. This statement applies particularly to more serious criminal acts, probably carried out by individuals or small groups, where for example firearms or explosives are used or where people are directly and specifically at least threatened with violence. While planned violence carried out from within a crowd or spontaneous affray are possible at any time, more serious acts of violence require a significantly reduced threshold of inhibition and are not something likely to be committed by all those prepared to use violence. As regards the use of explosives by left-wing extremists, the sentences passed down in recent years should act as a deterrent. However, it will only be possible to assess this in future if tactical restraint no longer provides a possible motive – in any case, this statement does not apply in absolute terms, as can be seen from the IED/IID attacks

linked to WEF 2013. In addition, radicalisation can occur for extremely diverse reasons, and these may also lead to a rise in the potential for violence. There are currently no indications of any such development or of a move toward terrorist tactics in any of the three extremist scenes.

### Right-wing extremism

There is only a low probability that the far right scene will abandon its conspiratorial behaviour and again step into the public spotlight in one form or another in the near future. This is worrying to the extent that it makes it impossible to determine their intentions and plans. The events recorded offer no specific clues. It is difficult to assess what effect this situation will have on the potential for violence.

How stable the scene can remain in this form over the longer term is also difficult to assess. Far right groups abroad, for example, may exert an influence on the Swiss scene. For example, around two years ago, a new far right network



Right-wing extremist posing on Facebook, posted on 12 June 2012

centred on the violent French Artam Brotherhood started to emerge in the French-Swiss border area, in which Swiss citizens may play an important structural role over and above contacts between individuals. Notwithstanding this, it is unlikely that the scene will grow overall; it is more likely that those who are really interested in politics will turn away from it and seek involvement elsewhere. There is no indication that the conspiratorial scene is turning into an underground movement carrying out serious acts of violence or terrorist actions and procuring the means to do so by criminal methods.

### Left-wing extremism


During a demonstration in November 2012, stickers bearing the slogan ‘The kids want communism’ were put up. The veracity of this statement, shaped more by present-day consumer culture than by Marxism-Leninism, is questionable; however, it indicates the far left scene’s generational problem. It is anticipated that the influence of Marxist-Leninist groups will weaken and that anarchism, which is clearly less theory-oriented, will increase in significance. There is already considerable evidence of this. We must therefore expect spontaneous, varied and unpredictable actions and that the targets of attacks will become even more diverse. An increase in acts of sabotage is also to be anticipated, without the level of violence necessarily rising. In the short term – unless the tactic of keeping a low profile is abandoned – no rise in violence or serious attacks is anticipated. Events organised by the ‘free spaces’ move-

ment, which itself is free of violence, continue to provide potential for the use of violence and violent confrontations with the law enforcement agencies by left-wing extremists. In this situation, some members of the free spaces movement may take part in confrontations.

### Animal rights extremism

The SHAC campaign continues, and some of its main protagonists are about to be released. However, renewed intensification of the campaign involving the use of violence is unlikely in the near future, particularly in Switzerland. The campaign focuses on companies operating worldwide and in Switzerland with business links to Huntingdon Life Sciences.

While the potential for violence remains, there are no signs that one of the Swiss campaigns will be conducted violently in future. The close links between animal rights extremists prepared to use violence and the violent far left scene may continue to absorb some of their



Anti-WEF poster,  
Lucerne, January 2013

potential for violence. Conversely, it remains unlikely that left-wing extremist circles will adopt animal liberation as one of their aims.


## The FIS's mandate in combating violent extremism

In accordance with the Federal Act on Measures to Safeguard Internal Security (BWIS), the federal government takes preventive measures to detect at an early stage and combat threats from terrorism and violent extremism (Art. 2 (1)). Terrorism is defined as 'efforts to influence or change the state and society, which are to be implemented or promoted by the commission or threat of serious criminal acts and by the spreading of fear and terror' (Art. 4 (1) (b), Ordinance on the Federal Intelligence Service (OFIS)) and extremism as 'efforts by organizations whose representatives reject democracy, human rights or the rule of law and commit, advocate or support acts of violence in order to achieve their goals' (Art. 4 (1) (d) OFIS). The FIS has to operate within clear boundaries defined by BWIS. For example, it is only allowed to monitor events in public and openly accessible locations. Video and audio recordings may also be made only in public places. Coercive measures such as phone tapping can only be used by law enforcement agencies (police and public prosecution authorities) within the framework of criminal proceedings. The same is true of the monitoring of events on private premises.

In 2010, the Control Delegation (Joint Intelligence Oversight Delegation) made recommendations in its report on data processing in the computerized Information System for Internal Security (ISIS) which, among other things, prompted the tightening up of record-


ing procedures. Basically, the FIS no longer deals with neo-Nazis, holocaust deniers, racists or purchasers of propaganda material. Furthermore, the FIS can only become active if there is a specific link to violence (including incitement to violence) or if a known activist from an organization on the monitoring list is involved.

The monitoring list is annually approved by the Federal Council and, according to Article 11 (2) (b) BWIS, serves to identify those organizations and groups for which all observations on their activities and activists are required to be reported, i.e. for which the FIS is allowed to operate without the restrictions imposed on it by Article 3 (2) BWIS. These restrictions relate to information on political activity and to the exercise of freedom of expression, association and assembly. The monitoring list is thus not an exhaustive list of all the organizations and groups about whom the FIS processes data. ■



# Proliferation

The proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and their delivery systems remains one of the great problems of our time and is the subject of ever closer multilateral cooperation. At the centre of international concern are developments in Iran. Switzerland is integral to international efforts to contain the risks associated with proliferation. As a centre of high technology, Switzerland has a particular interest in preventing attempts to circumvent sanctions via this country.




## SITUATION

### Introduction

Where programmes of weapons of mass destruction and their delivery systems and the proliferation of the relevant technologies are concerned, the focus remains on Iran and North Korea. The international crisis surrounding the Iranian nuclear programme is moving towards a new peak, despite several rounds of talks which have taken place between Iran on the one hand and the five permanent members of the Security Council plus Germany on the other. Should attempts to dispel the fears of the international community regarding compliance with the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty and to reduce tensions through at least a partial solution fail, the crisis will in the foreseeable future lead to the dilemma of having to accept either a military operation to put a stop to the programme or a nuclear-armed Iran. On the Indian subcontinent, too, arsenals and technologies continue to be developed.

### Iranian nuclear programme: expansion despite sanctions

The progress of Iran’s nuclear programme continues unabated, despite steadily increasing international sanctions pressure. Since October 2011, as part of its uranium enrichment programme, Iran has increased the number of centrifuges installed by around 5000, to over 13 000. The Fordo plant, which is dug into a mountain near Qom and the existence of which was first revealed in 2009, is now fully equipped and heavily protected by the military. The threshold enrichment level of 3.5 per cent needed for operating civilian reactors for generating electricity has been exceeded. Iran now possesses a quantity of uranium enriched to twenty per cent which, following further enrichment to weapons-grade ninety per cent, would be sufficient to build a nuclear explosive device. The possibility of producing plutonium for nuclear weapons is also coming within reach. Iran has indicated that the heavy water reactor in Arak will commence operation in 2014. This repre-



At left:  
enrichment plant in Fordo  
[Quickbird 2; photo dated  
31 January 2013]


At right:  
Ranges of Iranian  
delivery systems

sents a further improvement in the basic pre-conditions for producing weapons-grade fissile material rapidly, if needed. Furthermore, the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) reported several times last year on large-scale clean-up operations at the military complex in Parchin. The central concern is an area of the plant where there is thought to have been a detonation chamber of the kind which is also used for tests in the development of nuclear weapons. The clean-up operations included demolishing a number of objects and carrying out earthworks using heavy construction equipment. Iran has so far refused the IAEA's requests to visit the site.

**Iranian ballistic missiles: increasing deterrent capability**

In the area of delivery systems, too, Iran has continued to develop its capabilities, which it has demonstrated in military manoeuvres such as the large-scale Great Prophet 7 exercise in July 2012. For this exercise, a large number of

rockets, including several guided missiles from the Shahab series, were fired at a rapid rate at simulated bases in the desert. This series has been in use by the armed forces for some years and includes the SHAHAB-3M, which provides Iran with a delivery system suitable for a nuclear explosive device. However, with the Shahab-3/3M (range 1100-1600 km) the performance improvement in this liquid propellant system now seems to have hit a technological barrier. In quantitative terms, the expansion of the arsenal continues. However, no longer-range systems have been introduced since 2012. The satellite launch observed in February 2012 was the third to be carried out with a launch vehicle based on the SHAHAB-3M. An even larger launch vehicle, which could in future be used as a platform for intercontinental-range missiles (over 5500 kilometres), is still not operational. The introduction of the new Ashura/Sejil solid-propellant missile (range 2000 kilometres) will represent a genuine quantum leap in military terms: it is at an advanced stage of





development, and the fact that it can be prepared for deployment easily and quickly will bring significant operational advantages. Furthermore, since 2012 Iran has been improving its short-range systems (ranges below 1000 kilometres), in particular, with the first flight test of a new version of the Fateh 110 solid-fuel missile (range 300 kilometres), which is supposed to be more accurate than its predecessor model. Overall, Iran's deterrent capability in the Persian Gulf has improved in qualitative and quantitative terms.

**North Korean nuclear programme: progress on building new reactor**

Information about the North Korean nuclear programme remains fragmentary. In the summer of 2012, North Korea completed external construction work on a new light-water reactor in the nuclear complex at Yongbyon, north of the capital. However, it will still be some time before key components are installed inside. Since the beginning of 2012 no further details have been disclosed about the status of North Korea's uranium enrichment programme, which was first made public in 2010. Its technical features and capacity, in particular, have yet to be confirmed. On 12 February 2013, North Korea carried out a third nuclear weapons test at the Punggye-ri test site. At the time of going to press, analysis of data from the automatic measuring stations distributed across the globe which are run by the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty Organisation was not yet complete. However, the seismological readings show an event which was approximately

twice as powerful as that recorded during the last test in 2009.

**North Korean ballistic missiles: steady progress**

The mainstay of missile construction in North Korea is a complete series of liquid-propellant guided missiles which are largely based on the technology of older systems from the Soviet Scud series. The short- and medium-range missiles developed by North Korea have already been sold on to a number of countries. The longer-range Taepodong-1 and -2 models are described by North Korea as space rockets. In April 2012, the launch of a Taepodong-2 (under the name UNHA-3) failed spectacularly, but in December the same system put a satellite into Earth orbit. In 2012, a technologically more advanced liquid-propellant missile was again displayed at a parade, but no flight test has yet been observed. In terms of more modern solid-propellant missile technology, North Korea still lags behind Iran or Pakistan.

**Pakistan and India: optimisation and expansion of mature arsenals**

On the Indian subcontinent, too, the development of technologies and arsenals is proceeding apace. Pakistan has a well-developed arsenal of guided ballistic missiles, including in particular the modern solid-propellant Ghaznavi and Shaheen series (maximum range 2500 kilometres). All systems are capable of carrying nuclear warheads. Pakistan is currently working on smaller delivery systems and cruise missiles which are suitable for deploying tactical nu-

clear weapons. This development is backed by a massive expansion of plutonium production capacity and leads one to assume that Pakistan is also working on further miniaturisation of its nuclear warheads. Over the years, the objective here is to achieve nuclear deterrence at a tactical level.

India also has a mature arsenal of ballistic missiles. The Agni series, in particular, uses modern solid-propellant technology and can carry nuclear warheads. The largest missile in this series, the Agni-V, which potentially has an intercontinental range (defined as over 5500 kilometres) was flight tested for the first time in 2012. India is currently working on completion of its nuclear triad (land-, air- and sea-based systems). In 2009, the Arihant-class nuclear submarine was launched. Its status remains unclear, however. In parallel with this, sea-based guided ballistic missiles are being developed. India is continuing to expand not only its civilian but also its military nuclear programme. Its stocks of nuclear weapons are thought to be slightly smaller than those of Pakistan.

## ASSESSMENT

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### **Nuclear crisis with Iran moving towards a peak**

Development of the nuclear and guided missile programmes referred to above is proceeding. In the international context, the Iranian nuclear programme is the most virulent. The crisis has been following a cyclical pattern since 2002, but is currently heading for a new peak. Iran has so far failed to rebut the allegations which the IAEA has raised regularly and since the end of 2011 with an increasing sense of urgency. Meanwhile, Iran is subject to international economic sanctions on a scale coming close to a complete embargo. Nonetheless, the Iranian nuclear programme has reached a stage where diplomatic efforts to find a solution risk being overtaken either by military intervention or by the development of an Iranian nuclear weapon. A nuclear-armed Iran would not only have implications in the region and further afield, but would in particular shake the foundations of international efforts to curb proliferation and might provoke a new nuclear arms race.

North Korea's uranium enrichment capabilities are unclear, but in the area of centrifuge technology it could be ahead of Iran. In the past, the regime in North Korea has had no qualms about selling its missile technology to numerous customers like Pakistan, Iran, Libya, Egypt and Syria, with no strings attached. It is capable of supplying the entire range of products needed for a nuclear weapons programme, including

the production of fissile material (uranium and plutonium), the construction of a simple nuclear explosive device and the delivery systems required. Pakistan is vigorously expanding its nuclear programme and is currently seeking out dual-use goods to build up an efficient command and deployment structure.

## PROSPECTS


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### Risks to Switzerland diverse

The flow of European controlled goods and technologies to proliferation-sensitive countries via third countries poses a major challenge for Swiss export controls. Switzerland has excellent industrial capabilities and offers an attractive and, by international standards, open research location. Thanks to international cooperation and collaboration with industry, it has been possible to thwart procurement attempts on numerous occasions. In line with the tightening of international sanctions against Iran, the FIS has observed increasing attempts to circumvent these sanctions via Switzerland.

However, the challenges are mounting. Procurement channels continue to be developed and reorganised. Many of these run via Asia. The increasing outsourcing of production abroad is also making it more difficult both for industry and for the authorities to monitor the flow of sensitive goods. In areas relevant to proliferation, there is also a discernible tendency among purchasers to focus on the procurement of subsystems and components. Identifying critical subsystems and withdrawing them from illegal trade is infinitely more difficult than is the case with complete systems, the export of which is subject to tighter and ever more effective international controls.


The fact that the FIS has no legal basis for controlling financial flows and is restricted to monitoring the flow of goods is also a disadvantage. ■



# Illegal intelligence

Switzerland continues to be a target for espionage, as illustrated by a case in which Georgian opposition figures were under observation by officials of the Georgian Ministry of the Interior. Besides traditional methods, intelligence services are also increasingly using sophisticated electronic cyber espionage tools.

Swiss research is a major target of illegal intelligence. It is a world leader in many areas. However, this also makes Swiss universities, research centres and centres of excellence attractive to foreign intelligence services.



## SITUATION

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### Switzerland as a target for espionage

The aim of espionage against Switzerland or Swiss interests is the procurement of information to improve or consolidate a party's own position relative to international political and economic rivals, and specifically to influence competitors and opponents. The attraction of Switzerland as a target for espionage by foreign intelligence services can be attributed principally to the following elements:

- its central location in Europe, the presence of the UN and other international bodies, especially in Geneva, its position as a financial centre, its role in energy and commodity trading and its good transport and communications infrastructure make Switzerland an attractive target for information gathering by foreign intelligence services.
- Swiss research is world class in many areas, and Switzerland is home to a range of renowned research institutes. This success also brings with it risks. Swiss universities, research centres and centres of excellence (including those in the private sector) may, due to their research activities and results, make attractive targets for foreign intelligence services and commercial rivals.
- Foreign regime opponents and opposition figures who have taken up residence in Switzerland are also targets for foreign intelligence services. This applies in particular to

states in which freedom of expression and of the media is restricted and which have the intention and the resources at their disposal to pursue regime opponents worldwide.

Countries seeking to procure the necessary technology and know-how for the production of weapons of mass destruction are attempting to achieve their objectives in Switzerland using intelligence and other methods.

### Diversity of methods: From human intelligence to cyber espionage

Intelligence services use a variety of espionage methods. On the one hand, they continue to work with traditional tools such as human intelligence obtained through their own networks of informants and agents, which they use to acquire information on the ground. On the other hand, they are also increasingly using sophisticated electronic signals intelligence and communications intelligence tools, such as infiltrating IT networks, making use of targets' mobile phones as listening devices and carrying out legal and illegal surveillance via the internet. Intelligence services and companies also use private, commercially active agencies (detective agencies, accountancy firms, consultancy firms etc.), as well as hackers, in order to access confidential data and information.

### **Variety of possible disguises**

In Switzerland, foreign intelligence service officers attempt to gain access to decision makers in political, economic and other fields. To do so, they may disguise themselves as diplomats, journalists or businesspeople. In this way, they can gather preliminary information, investigate a target's environment and contact people without attracting suspicion. Foreign intelligence service officers also attend public events, where they keep a lookout for suitable targets – interpreters and translators as well as interns and PhD students who have access to confidential information constitute valuable targets for foreign intelligence service officers, who carefully recruit them, develop them and then exploit them.

### **Combating espionage through legal measures relating to foreign nationals**

The Confederation can take a variety of measures against known spies or against persons suspected of illegal intelligence activity. Switzerland can discreetly approach the countries of origin of officials engaged in intelligence activity and make the legal position clear to them. Other counterespionage sanctions, which at the same time are the most effective preventive measures, include refusal to grant accreditation and visas, expulsions, entry bans and, in the case of diplomats, persona-non-grata declarations. Above a certain level, differences are settled publicly so as to send the appropriate signal.

### **Tensions between counterespionage and political interests**

Although administrative measures are regularly taken to keep persons from various countries out of Switzerland on the grounds of illegal intelligence activity, Switzerland's political and security interests continually have to be weighed up against one another, particularly in connection with international organisations and negotiations on Swiss territory. For example, the presence of known foreign intelligence service officers at international negotiations may in individual cases knowingly be accepted, in order not to jeopardise the negotiations themselves. Switzerland's protecting power mandates for third countries as well as economic or political interests can also lead to a certain need for restraint.

### **Cyber espionage with ever more complex software**

The advantage of cyber espionage for the perpetrators and those employing them is that no-one has to be present on the ground and so traditional methods of counterespionage are often ineffective. In addition, the use of electronic means makes it possible to steal large quantities of data at once or within a short time. Such cases of sophisticated electronic espionage methods are regularly recorded. A recent example of this is the Flame spyware, which was discovered by IT experts in May 2012. Flame is designed as a modular system and is used to gather information of all kinds. For example, Flame can create audio recordings, log keystrokes, monitor network traffic or copy screenshots. If the infected



computer has Bluetooth, the malware can even gather information from devices in the same room with an activated Bluetooth connection, such as the address book of a mobile phone. It is thought that Flame has already been used for a number of years to carry out attacks in the Middle East. So far, we are not aware of any infected computers in Switzerland.

It is thought that Flame, similarly to the Stuxnet virus discovered in 2010, spreads itself via USB sticks or local networks. However, due to its enormous range of functions, the programme is twenty times larger than Stuxnet, which was deployed with only one very specific purpose in mind – very probably the sabotage of the Iranian uranium enrichment plant in Natanz.

### Infection through doctored weblinks still widespread

For electronic espionage attacks, attackers also use common traditional methods of infection such as e-mails and doctored links. The targets receive customised e-mails with fake sender addresses. As soon as the recipient clicks on the link, malware is loaded and installed. In ad-

dition, a channel to a control server is opened, via which data can be removed from the infected computer. It is known that this method is used against employees of the foreign and defence ministries of a number of countries.

```

mov     edx, [ebp+var_44]
shl     edx, 7
mov     eax, [ebp+var_44]
shr     eax, 19h
or      edx, eax
mov     [ebp+var_44], edx
mov     ecx, [ebp+var_44]
add     ecx, [ebp+var_48]
mov     [ebp+var_44], ecx
mov     edx, [ebp+var_44]
and     edx, [ebp+var_48]
mov     eax, [ebp+var_44]
not     eax
and     eax, [ebp+var_50]
or      edx, eax
add     edx, [ebp+var_3C]
mov     ecx, [ebp+var_4C]
lea     eax, [ecx+edx-17384]
mov     [ebp+var_4C], edx
mov     eax, [ebp+var_4C]
shl     eax, 0Ch
mov     ecx, [ebp+var_4C]
shr     ecx, 14h
or      eax, ecx
mov     [ebp+var_4C], eax
mov     edx, [ebp+var_4C]
add     edx, [ebp+var_4C]
mov     [ebp+var_4C], edx
mov     eax, [ebp+var_4C]
and     eax, [ebp+var_44]
mov     ecx, [ebp+var_4C]
not     ecx
and     ecx, [ebp+var_48]
or      eax, ecx
add     eax, [ebp+var_38]
mov     edx, [ebp+var_50]
lea     eax, [edx+eax+24207]
mov     [ebp+var_50], eax
mov     ecx, [ebp+var_50]
shl     ecx, 11h
mov     edx, [ebp+var_50]
shr     edx, 0Fh
    
```

Pseudocode-A

```

141  int v141; // [sp+2Ch] [bp-24h]@1
142  int v142; // [sp+30h] [bp-20h]@1
143  int v143; // [sp+34h] [bp-1Ch]@1
144  int v144; // [sp+38h] [bp-18h]@1
145  int v145; // [sp+3Ch] [bp-14h]@1
146  int v146; // [sp+40h] [bp-10h]@1
147  int v147; // [sp+44h] [bp-Ch]@1
148  int v148; // [sp+48h] [bp-8h]@1
149  int v149; // [sp+4Ch] [bp-4h]@1
150
151  v2 = *(DWORD *)a1;
152  v3 = *(DWORD *) (a1 + 4);
153  v4 = *(DWORD *) (a1 + 8);
154  v5 = *(DWORD *) (a1 + 12);
155  sub_4049C0(&v134, a2, 64);
156  v6 = v2 + v134 + (v5 & ~v3 | v4 & v3) - 0x28955888;
157  v7 = v3 + ((v6 >> 25) | (v6 << 7));
158  v8 = v5 + v135 + (v4 & ~v7 | v3 & v7) - 0x173848AA;
159  v9 = v7 + ((v8 >> 20) | (v8 << 12));
160  v10 = v4 + v136 + (v3 & ~v9 | v7 & v9) + 0x2420700B;
161  v11 = v9 + ((v10 >> 15) | (v10 << 17));
162  v12 = v3 + v137 + (v7 & ~v11 | v9 & v11) - 0x3E423112;
163  v13 = v11 + ((v12 >> 10) | (v12 << 22));
164  v14 = v7 + v138 + (v9 & ~v13 | v11 & v13) - 0xA83F051;
165  v15 = v13 + ((v14 >> 25) | (v14 << 7));
166  v16 = v9 + v139 + (v11 & ~v15 | v13 & v15) + 0x4787C62;
167  v17 = v15 + ((v16 >> 20) | (v16 << 12));
168  v18 = v11 + v140 + (v13 & ~v17 | v15 & v17) - 0x57CFB9;
169  v19 = v17 + ((v18 >> 15) | (v18 << 17));
170  v20 = v13 + v141 + (v15 & ~v19 | v17 & v19) - 0x2B96AF;
171  v21 = v19 + ((v20 >> 10) | (v20 << 22));
172  v22 = v15 + v142 + (v17 & ~v21 | v19 & v21) + 0x698098;
173  v23 = v21 + ((v22 >> 25) | (v22 << 7));
174  v24 = v17 + v143 + (v19 & ~v23 | v21 & v23) - 0x748B08;
    
```

Part of the source code of malware used for espionage

## ASSESSMENT

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### Surveillance of opposition figures ongoing

The fact that regime opponents and opposition figures who have taken up residence in Switzerland remain targets for surveillance by the intelligence services of their countries by origin is shown by a recent example. At the beginning of April 2012, the Zurich city police checked a male suspect who had proved his identity using a Georgian passport with a valid Schengen visa. The man was carrying a variety of bugging devices and optical recording devices on his person and in his luggage. The police then searched the Georgian's hotel room, where they came across a second Georgian man. Further high-tech observation devices were also found in the room. The two men had taken photos and video recordings of Georgian opposition politicians who were also staying in Zurich. One of the people observed lives in Switzerland and has applied for asylum here. The two men arrested were officially identified by Georgia as Ministry of the Interior officials. Following extensive investigations, they were released from custody on bail at the beginning of May 2012.

This case goes to show how active foreign intelligence services are in Switzerland and that they are often very well equipped in terms of technology. There are indications that other countries are also carrying out surveillance of regime opponents living here and in some cases harassing them.

### Cyber espionage still on the rise

The identity of those behind electronic espionage attacks cannot usually be established with absolute certainty. Nonetheless, based on the origin of the attacks and in-depth analysis of them (methods used, degree of complexity of the attacks, victims of the attacks, type of information gathered), the FIS has clear indications that the authorities of various countries have been directly or indirectly involved in cyber attacks. At the least, they have tolerated on their territory hackers who were acting in their interest. For example, it is plausible that intelligence services might orchestrate extensive hacker attacks as part of their monitoring of political opposition abroad. The financial resources and analytical skills which have been used in some cyber attacks go far beyond the capabilities of cyber-criminal organisations or hacker groups. Furthermore, except in cases of economic espionage, the data stolen in such attacks has no economic value in the criminal world, but is of importance only in political circles.

Some of these cyber attacks can be ascribed not to intelligence services but to individuals or private groups. The latter may be state-sponsored or employed by companies under state control, or they may be acting on their own initiative in order subsequently to pass on the stolen data to buyers. It is highly probable that government agencies or institutions collaborating with such agencies work closely together with private hackers in individual cases. The

nature of the stolen data in some cases suggests that the end users are known to the hackers and that the users have at their disposal considerable technical resources and analytical capabilities for evaluating the stolen data.

### **Network operators as Trojan horses?**

At the end of April 2012 it became public knowledge that a Chinese company was to expand the network infrastructure of a large Swiss telecommunications service provider and also to run its operations. In this context – as previously with regard to the strong position of US and Israeli firms in the area of critical components for the telecommunications industry – the question arose whether penetration of domestic telecommunications markets by foreign firms could endanger national security. This is particularly important with regard to access to sensitive information or potential sabotage of information infrastructure.

Although FIS is currently not aware of any such security-relevant occurrences in Switzerland or abroad, it cannot be ruled out that participation by foreign telecommunications companies in the construction or operation of Swiss telecommunications networks could be misused by foreign intelligence services. However, telecommunications companies with global contracts have no interest in deliberately exposing themselves to machinations of this kind. If espionage or sabotage were proved, the company concerned could expect to suffer con-

siderable loss of trust and reputational damage, even to the point of being refused access to certain domestic markets.

Prevention measures pertaining to telecommunications and also to other critical infrastructures include risk and vulnerability analyses at all levels affected (Confederation, cantons, network operators), involving system suppliers and service providers. Based on the results of these analyses, the necessary administrative and technical security measures can then be put in place.

#### **Data theft from the FIS**

In early summer 2012, data was stolen by an employee in the FIS's IT department. The case is the subject of ongoing criminal proceedings instituted by the Office of the Attorney General and of investigation by the Control Delegation (GPDel). The GPDel investigations are expected to be completed in spring 2013 with a report to the Federal Council.

## PROSPECTS

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### Important role of prevention

Investigation and prosecution in the area of illegal intelligence are lengthy and complex processes. Besides espionage from outside, internal perpetrators can also potentially inflict great damage.


Switzerland will remain an attractive target for information gathering by foreign intelligence services, due to the high technological standards of Swiss industry, Switzerland's status as an international centre for research, the presence of the UN and other international bodies, Switzerland's position as a financial centre, its role in energy and commodity trading and its central location in Europe and excellent infrastructure. Alongside the traditional methods of espionage, which continue to be directed against not only economic, but also political and military targets, the threat posed by cyber attacks, in particular, will remain a major problem for the foreseeable future.

The FIS has statutory responsibility for taking preventive measures to counter the espionage activities of foreign intelligence services. One such preventive measure is the FIS' Prophylax programme. The FIS uses this to raise awareness of the risks of proliferation and espionage among companies and research and higher educational institutions. While companies in proliferation-sensitive and other high-tech areas, in particular, have been receiving regular information updates from the FIS and its predecessors for some time, the FIS is currently focussing its

attention on university institutes in the area of advanced technology.

In order to meet the challenges posed in the area of research, the FIS has set up Technopole, a prevention and awareness-raising programme aimed specifically at the research sector in Switzerland. Technopole's aim is to provide support and collaborate with Swiss universities and research institutes in combating threats relating to illegal intelligence, information leaks and proliferation.


Building on the experience gained from Prophylax, initial discussions with representatives of the Confederation and the cantons in the field of research were held in 2012. A variety of information and awareness-raising measures are at various stages of planning, and implementation is scheduled to commence in 2013. ■



# Attacks on Swiss information infrastructures

With increasing global digital networking, the vulnerability of information and communication (ICT) infrastructures to disruption and attack has increased, as has the potential for this to be misused for criminal, intelligence, terrorist or military purposes.

Prolonged or extensive disruptions could have a considerable impact on Switzerland's capabilities. ICT is a particularly attractive target for attacks, because it offers many opportunities for misuse, manipulation and damage and because attacks can be carried out largely anonymously and with relatively little outlay.



## SITUATION

### Networked society highly vulnerable to cyber risks

The opportunities for misusing information and communication (ICT) infrastructures for criminal, intelligence, terrorist or military purposes or for disrupting their functions are almost unlimited, as is their use for positive purposes. It must be assumed that the underlying trend – the increasing interconnectedness and thus also the growing complexity of ICT – will continue.

The functioning of Switzerland as an integrated system (state, economy, transport, energy supply, communications etc.) depends on an increasing number of interconnected information and communications facilities. This infrastructure is vulnerable. Prolonged or extensive disruptions and attacks could considerably impair Switzerland's technical, economic and administrative capabilities. ICT is a particularly attractive target for attacks, not just because it


offers many opportunities for misuse, manipulation and damage, but also because it can be used largely anonymously and with relatively little outlay.

### Targeted attacks on strategically important industries

Recent examples of cyber risks are the attacks using the Flame spyware and also the Wiper malware, which in April 2012 compromised the communications network of Iran's oil ministry, read out data from its networks and finally completely wiped the hard disks of infected systems. To contain Wiper and as a security precaution, the computer systems of Iran's oil ministry and various oil terminals had to be disconnected from the internet temporarily.

The discovery of a new Trojan called Gauss potentially has even greater consequences for a service sector that is strategically important to Switzerland. This malware targeting bank data, which was uncovered in the course of investigations into the Flame malware, is thought to have infected tens of thousands of computers in Lebanon and in Israel and Palestine. Its malicious functions include tracing internet passwords and gaining access to online accounts, personal cookies, browser history and other individual system settings.

Gauss was first sighted in September 2011 and was identified in June 2012. In July 2012, the control servers were deactivated by the attackers; since that time, the Trojan has been in



MELANI's semi annual report is available on the internet ([www.melani.admin.ch](http://www.melani.admin.ch))

sleep mode in infected systems. Like the earlier Duqu and Flame malware, Gauss contains a self-destruct mechanism in order to evade detection by antivirus programmes.

It is still unclear what security loopholes Gauss used to gain entry into target systems. However, Gauss also uses USB sticks in order to gather information via other computers. It is similar in design and structure to the Flame malware. This suggests that they originate from the same government source. This would explain why, although Gauss spies on bank accounts, it does not trigger payment to the perpetrators' accounts. According to a firm specialising in malware, Gauss is thought to focus particularly on banks in the Middle East; this geographical restriction could, however, easily be altered by its creators.



## ASSESSMENT

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### Impairment of vital functions

Many services today are provided and used via electronic channels. This increases the presence on the internet of all players and thus their dependence on critical infrastructures. At the same time, the cyber risks to the economy are growing, for example through attacks with the intention to defraud or secure financial gain, or through economic espionage. Cyber attacks on critical infrastructures can have particularly serious consequences because they may impair vital functions or trigger fatal chain reactions. It is therefore essential that any strategy to protect against cyber risks should include the economy, especially operators of critical infrastructures (as providers of services with overriding security importance), ICT service and system providers.

### New national strategy to counter cyber risks

It is in Switzerland's national interest to protect ICT from disruption and attack. In recent years, measures have been taken to reduce risks in the cybersphere. Nonetheless, it has been shown that these are not sufficient in all cases. As a further increase in disruptions of and attacks on ICT is expected, on 27 June 2012 the Federal Council presented a national strategy for protecting Switzerland against cyber risks and a national strategy for protecting critical infrastructures. The strategy for protecting Switzerland against cyber risks shows

what form these risks currently take, how Switzerland is equipped to deal with them, where the weaknesses lie and how these can be most effectively and efficiently remedied.

Here, the Federal Council is pursuing the following strategic aims:

- early detection of threats and dangers in the cybersphere
- improvement of the resilience of critical infrastructures
- effective reduction of cyber risks, in particular cyber crime, cyber espionage and cyber sabotage

Acting within one's individual responsibility, together with national collaboration between the economy and the authorities, as well as cooperation with other countries, are and will remain essential basic conditions and prerequisites for reducing cyber risks. A continuous reciprocal exchange of information creates transparency and trust. The state should intervene only if the public interest is at stake or if it is acting in accordance with the principle of subsidiarity.

### Decentralised approach the best solution

The use of ICT tools to support processes and structures also changes the risks these processes are exposed to. Effective management of cyber risks thus works on the principle that the existing functions and responsibilities of the

authorities, the economy and the population in general will increasingly involve a cyber element. The national strategy is thus also based on the idea that every political, economic and social organisational unit is responsible for identifying this cyber element, addressing the risks entailed for their respective processes and reducing these as far as possible. The decentralised structures of government and the economy should be strengthened for these tasks, and existing resources and processes should be systematically exploited.

In its strategy, the Federal Council recognises that in Switzerland, collaboration between the authorities and the economy is generally firmly established and functions well. It wants to use its strategy for protecting Switzerland from cyber risks to deepen this collaboration in the cybersphere and further strengthen the foundations which have already been laid, in order to minimise cyber risks. It is therefore relying on existing structures and has decided against creating a new central control and coordination body such as are now being set up in other countries, sometimes with less well-developed collaboration between the relevant players. Rather, it plans to boost the dissemination of information, together with comprehensive analysis of existing information on cyber risks and threats, in order to support the authorities, the economy and operators of critical infrastructures in a way that is more closely tailored to their needs. To this end, the Reporting and Analysis Centre for Information Assurance (MELANI) will also be allocated additional staffing within the FIS.

The responsible federal agencies identified in the strategy are to implement appropriate measures as part of their basic remit. The aim is to involve partners from the authorities, the economy and society in this implementation process. A coordinating unit in the FDF (Federal Department of Finance) will review the implementation of the measures and the need for further precautions to minimise risks.

## PROSPECTS

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### **Establishment of entire espionage infrastructures**

Recent attacks using malware such as Flame, Gauss and Wiper show once again that in the case of cyber risks it is no longer just a question of isolated spying or sabotage attacks, but rather of an enduring interest in access to systems, data and information. The pressure on sensitive data and systems is increasing. Perpetrators are able to operate espionage infrastructure for years undetected. It must therefore be assumed from the latest cases that further espionage software which has not yet been discovered is already in position and is either being used in parallel or being held in readiness as a replacement in the event of an attack being discovered, in order to be able to continue eavesdropping on and sabotaging systems and networks which have already been infiltrated.

### **Market for stolen financial data emerging**

With the outflow of customer data which has become public in recent years and its sale to financial and tax authorities outside Switzerland, a market for such information is likely to have developed rapidly. Not only does this provide the opportunity for specific Trojans such as Gauss to be used to gain targeted access to such customer data and financial flows, but it must be assumed that such data can also be gathered by internet criminals who, though primarily interested in the infected customers'


money, will automatically also have access to their bank data. If this trend continues, countries might also attempt to access such data via the underground market.

### **Central role of the intelligence services**

The perpetrators in such cases are often not satisfied with carrying out a single attack, since electronic espionage, in particular, is a long drawn-out process. They thrive on establishing and exploiting sources and constantly setting up new ones. Single cyber events often turn out, on closer inspection, to be part of a complex web of cases. The aim of the FIS and of Melani is to establish such links in both the national and international arenas and thereby make it possible to combat the threats effectively.


As the Confederation's new cyber strategy shows, without a strong and focused intelligence component in the detection, analysis, assessment and countering of cyber threats, successes will be difficult to achieve. Increasing interconnectedness and the resulting ever-greater opportunities for infiltration are making it possible even for purely financially-motivated criminals to carry out actions that could pose a threat to or be harmful to the state. There are growing indications that states and their intelligence services are relying more and more on the opportunities presented by cyber attacks to supplement or replace their existing operations. ■





# List of abbreviations

ALF .....	Animal Liberation Front
AQAP .....	Al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula
AQIM .....	Al Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb
BWIS .....	Federal Act on Measures to Safeguard Internal Security / Bundesgesetz über Massnahmen zur Wahrung der inneren Sicherheit
CIS .....	Commonwealth of Independent States
ECB.....	European Central Bank
FAI .....	Informal Anarchist Federation / Federazione Anarchica Informale
FDFA.....	Federal Department of Foreign Affairs
fedpol .....	Federal Office of Police
GPDel.....	Control Delegation
IAEA.....	International Atomic Energy Agency
ICT.....	Information and communication technology
IED/IID .....	Improvised explosive/incendiary device
LTTE.....	Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam
MELANI.....	Reporting and Analysis Centre for Information Assurance
NATO.....	North Atlantic Treaty Organisation
NSU .....	National Socialist Underground
OFIS.....	Ordinance on the Federal Intelligence Service
PFLP .....	Popular Front of the Liberation of Palestine
PKK .....	Kurdistan Workers' Party
RAF.....	Red Army Faction / Rote Armee Fraktion
RAS.....	Revolutionärer Aufbau Schweiz
RAZ .....	Revolutionärer Aufbau Zürich
RJZ.....	Revolutionäre Jugend Zürich
SHAC.....	Stop Huntingdon Animal Cruelty
SRI .....	International Red Aid / Secours Rouge International
WEF .....	World Economic Forum



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
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